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Abstract: It is time for European Union and Chinese leaders to build on the 
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation， quickly conclude on-going 
negotiations on their EU -China Bilateral Investment Treaty， and begin substantive 
negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement? China is now the European Union's 
second-biggest trading partner behind the United States， and the European Union is 
China's biggest trading partner. China is reaching to become the leader in globalism and 
is investing heavily to make it happen. One of the world's largest projects， the Belt and 
Road Initiative is a primary driver of China's larger development strategy. A key aim of 
由eBRI is to promote economic connectivity among countries in Eurasia by recreating 
由ehistoric Silk Road along several land corridors and sea routes. While the parts of the 
project fit together like a giant jigsaw puzzle， one of the most important corridors is the 
road between the European Union and China where China is the European Union's 
biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export market. China is motivated to 
address historic obstacles and seize the opportunities for growth. At the same time， China 
can develop i臼 ownmega-regional free trade agreement as other such agreements grow 
但・ound由em，such as由eComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement， while China's 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and European Union's Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership languish. China's first step might be an EU-China free 
町adeagreement setting standards among the European Union's 28 countries and China 
and paving the Silk road with a model for the 68 countries touched by the BRI 
encompassing about two-thirds of the world's population and 40% of global GDP. This 
paper will compare and discuss the possible accommodations necessary to reconcile the 
different approaches in free trade agreements by the European Union and China， with a 
focus on labor standards and dispute resolution provisions in their existing 台eetrade 
agreements， in the context of curr・entglobal obligations， including the International 
Labour Organisation， Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development， and 
others. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Background In 2014， Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the 
European Union and China to“actively explore" a bilateral free trade 
agreement: 
“Together we make up one-third of the global economy. We 
must actively explore the possibility of a free trade area and the 
goal of bringing [annual] bilateral trade to one trilion dollars 
by 2020. . . . We must work to make China and the EU the twin 
engines for global economic growth." 1 
There are many reasons and opportunities why they should 
contemplate an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (“FTA") at this time. 
Against a background in which the United States is increasingly 
drawing into question its commitments to free trade and the 
global commons， and with the uncertainty resulting from 
Brexit， there clearly exists a need for China and the EU not only 
to increase the breadth and depth of their cooperation， but also 
to act more strategically in the way they relate to each other.2 
There is increasing common interest and cooperation between the 
European Union and China. European Council President， Donald Tusk， has 
called for reform of the World Trade Organization， including new rules on 
industrial subsidies and intellectual property rights， as Europe tries to form a 
Shawn Donnan & Andrew Byrne， China Courts EU on Bilateral Trade Agreement， FIN. TIMES 
(April 1， 2014)， https://www.ft.comJcontent!77dc2efc-b9b4-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdcO. See generally 
Theresa Fallon， China's Pivot to Europe， 36 AM. FOREIGN POL'y INT. 175 (2014) (The author urges caution 
on understanding the many implications of such treaty arrangements). 
2 AUCIA GARcIA-HERRERO ET AL.， EU-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO 2025: BUILDING A 
COMMON FUTURE iv (The Royal Institute of International Affairs， 2017). Britain (which may exit the EU 
under its Brexit plan) and China are also discussing町adeagreements“Speaking to reporters in Beijing 
after meeting British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt， Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the two 
countries agreed to increase位以leand investment. Hunt said Wang made an offer‘to open discussions 
about a possible free-trade deal between Britain and China post Brexit. "， China Open to Talks on Free-
Trade Deal with Post-Brexit Britain， Visiting Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt Says， SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (July 30， 2018)， https:/ /www.scmp.comJnews/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2157389/free-trade-
agenda-britains-new-foreign-minister-trip. See also AUCIA GARCIA-HERRERO & JIANWEI Xu， WHAT 
CONSEQUENCES WOULD A POST-BREXIT CHINA-UK TRADE DEAL HAVE FOR THE EU?， (Bruegel， 2016)， 
https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/20 16/1 0IPC_18_16-1.pdf. 
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common front with China against Washington's trade tarifs.3 Perhaps it is 
time for the European Union and China to build on the existing EU-China 
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation， quickly conclude on-going 
negotiations on their EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT")， and 
initiate and expedite formal substantive negotiations on an EU-China FTA. 
China is now the European Union's second-biggest trading partner behind 
the United States， and the European Union is China's biggest trading partne工
The resulting FTA could enhance trade opportunities and contribute to 
China's employment opportunities and rising labor standards.4 
There are recent precedents indicating China is open to substantive 
labor provisions in its FTAs and these provisions will not be an obstacle to 
completing an EU-China FTA. 
After four years of negotiations， Switzerland has become the 
second European country [and first with labor provisions] to 
sign a free trade agreement with China. The importance of the 
FTA rests in the fact that China regards it as a significant trial 
run for further FTAs with industrialized countries and the 
European Union. . . . Right from the start， the Non-
govemmental Organizations and the trade unions successfully 
committed the Swiss negotiating party to the inclusion of a 
“durability chapter" in this FTA， which emphasizes human 
rights and labor rights as well as environmental standards.5 
China is striving to become the leader in globalism6 and is investing 
heavily in making it happen. One of the world's largest projects， the Belt and 
Lucy Hornby， Tusk Calls for WTO Rぐform:Europe Seeks Common Front with China Against 
Tarijf Threat， FIN. TIMES， July 15， 2018， ht甲s://www.ft.comJcontent!e683392c-88b8-11e8-bfge-
8771d5404543 
4 James Harrison et al.， Governing Labor Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the 
European Union's Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters， 57 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 260， 262 
(2019)， ht甲s://onlinelibrary. wiley .comJdoi/fulν10.11 1 l/jcms.12715 (studying “EU bilateral trade 
agreements in force prior to 2010， [and] concluding that those ‘with labor provisions have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on workers' rights in signatory nations. "') 
Vasco Pedrina & Zoltan Doka， Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement and Labor Rights， 
GLOBAL LABOUR COLUMN (Oct. 2014)， http://column.global-labour-university.org/2014/l0/switzerland-
china-free-trade-agreement.html (footnote omitted). 
6 See Ronald C. Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements? Chinese Style Global 
Trade: New Rules， No Labor Protections， 35 PAC. BASIN L. J. 1，5 (2017). 
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Road Initiative (“BRI")，7 is a primary driver of China's development 
strategy. A key aim of the BRI is to promote economic connectivity among 
countries in Eurasia by recreating the historic Silk Road by land and sea 
routes along several corridors. The land corridors include “roads， railways， 
bridges， power plants-anything that makes it easier for Europe， Asia， and 
Africa to trade goods with China."8 The BRI's sea route is“a chain of 
seaports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean that direct maritime 
trade to and from China.叫
While the parts of the project fit like a giant jigsaw puzzle， one of the 
most important corridors is the road between the EU and China-which has 
aided China as the European Union's biggest source of imports and second-
biggest export market. 10 
While China's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP") and the European Union's Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership ("TTIP") languish， other FTAs around China， such as the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Full Text: Action Plan on The Belt and Road Initiative， STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA， ht甲://english. www.gov.cn/archive/ 
publications/20 15/03/30/contenC2814 7 5080249035 .htm [https://perma.cc/N657-4LXP]. China' s State 
Counci11abe1s its “Si1k Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Si1k Road Initiatives" as the 
Belt and Road Initiative. It is exp1ained as follows:“The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia， 
Europe and A台ica，connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circ1e at one end and deve10ped European 
economic circ1e at the other， and encompassing countries with huge potentia1 for economic deve1opment. 
The Si1k Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China， Centra1 Asia， Russia and Europe (the 
Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gu1f and the Mediterranean Sea through Centra1 Asia and West 
Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia， South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean in one route， and from China's coast through the South China Sea to由eSouth Pacific in the 
other." Id. See also Xi Jinping， President of Peop1e's Republic of China， Work Together to Bui1d the Si1k 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Si1k Road (May 14， 2017)， in Full Text 01 President 
Xi's Speech at Opening 01 Belt and Road Forum， XINHUA (May 14， 2017)， http://www.xinhuanet.com! 
english/20 17 -05/14/c_136282982.htm. 
Sam Ellis， China's Trillion-Dollar Plan to Dominate Global Trade， VOX (Apri1 6， 2018， 2:45 
PM)， https://www.vox.com!2018/4/6/17206230/china-trade-belt-road-economy (inc1uding a video visually 
describing the BRI. A negative aspect of China's deve10pment can occur where China's 10ans to finance 
the roads， e.g.， in Sri Lanka， cannot be repaid， and China assumes contro1 over property and key ports in the 
affected country). 
9 Id. 
10 Countries and Regions:・ China， EUROPEAN COMM'N (Aug. 2， 2019)， 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (China and Europe町adeon average 
over n billion a day) 
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(“CPTPP") and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(“CETA")， have grown. China's most significant step toward its own 
bilateral or eventual mega-regional FTA might be an EU-China BIT and FTA 
setting its own standards among the EU's 28 countries and China， which 
would pave the Silk Road with a model for the other five corridors and the 
68 countries touched by the BRI encompassing about two-thirds of the 
world's population and account for more than 40% of global GDP.11 
Though there are many trade-related issues to resolve in the 
negotiation of any FTA， this article focuses on the obstacles surrounding the 
insertion of labor standards and their dispute resolution. Comparing 
provisions in China and the European Union's existing FTAs and BITs in the 
context of the parties' current global obligations， including to the 
International Labour Organization (“ILO")， WBO， and Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD")， this article questions 
whether labor provisions in BITs or FTAs will be an obstacle to reaching a 
final FTA. Following the Introduction， Part I discusses the economic 
opportunities and obstacles of an EU-China BIT and FTA and the status of 
the parties' current trade agreements. Part II compares the parties' 
respective approaches on labor standards and dispute resolution in FTAs and 
BITs. Part IV provides analyses on the comparisons of approaches， the 
possible influence of recent FTAs， and the possible labor provisions needing 
accommodation within intemational standards. Finally， Part V concludes that 
labor-standards provisions should not be an obstacle and suggests that the 
EU -China corridor of the new Silk Road could， and should， be paved with 
standards consistent with intemational labor standards and emanating from 
an EU-China FTA. 
I. NON-LEGAL 
A. Opportunities and Obstacles戸rGrowth and EZevated Standards 
The BRI is made up of six corridors that direct trade to and from 
China， and one of the most significant corridors is between China and the 
11 Charlie Campbell， China Says It's Building the New Silk Road. Here Are Five Things to Know 
Ahead 01 a Key Summit， TIME (May 12， 2017)， http://time.comJ4776845/china-xiサinping-belt-road-
initiative-obor/ 
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European Union.12 The BRI offers the opportunity of complementary 
benefits for the European Union and China.“The EU has the potential to 
become the westem ‘anchor' of the BRI."13 
As free traders in Washington like to point out， it matters who 
will write the rules or commerce in the 21st century. If the 
United States isn't interested anymore， why shouldn't the EU 
shoulder this responsibility? An EU-China free trade agreement 
might not include everything the [Trans-Pacific Partnership]14 
includes-there was a reason why China was never part of the 
TPP negotiations. But the EU could raise trade standards by 
asking China to put its money where its mouth is: the rhetoric 
coming out of Beijing in the past year has been vigorously 
globalist and pro-free trade. If Beijing wants to prove this isn't 
just rhetoric， a free-trade agreement with Brussels holds the 
key. In return， China would receive greater access to the market 
of its largest trading partner and European recognition of its 
market economy status， which neither the EU nor the United 
States currently recognizes. This would entail compromise from 
Chinese leaders， but it would also bring benefits and these 
concessions would be made to the EU， not to China's potential 
economic and strategic competitor， the United States. 15 
Even with the growing economic integration of the European Union 
and China there is stil much room for growth， especially through foreign 
12 Jonathan E. Hilman， The Rise of China-Europe Railways， CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDliS 
(Mar. 6， 2018)， htps:/ww.csis.org/analysis!rise-china-europe-railwa ys (“Just 10 years ago， regular direct 
t記ightservices from China to Europe did not exist. Today，出eyconect roughly 35 Chinese cities with 34 
European cities. Rail services are considerably cheaper than air and faster than sea . . . and could provide a 
compeling mi正ldleoption for more gods in the coming years. Rail's share of cargo by value is already 
growing， increasing 14 percent during由efirst half of 2017， ascompared to the same period in 2016. A 
study commissioned by the International Union of Railways estimates that China-Europe rail services could 
double their share of trade by volume over the next decade.") 
13 Garcia-Herero et al.， supra note 2， at vii-ix. 
14 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP") was an FTA between twelve Asia-Pacific countries由at
contained 呂町onglabor provisions. Before由eUnited States withdrew in 2017，由eTPP was set to become 
由eworld's largest fre trade deal， covering 40 percent of the global economy. See James McBride & 
Andrew Chatzky， What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?， COUNCILON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 4， 
2019)， htps:/ /ww.cfr.org/backgrounder/what -trans-pacific-partnership-tp. 
15 Andrei Lungu， A New G2: China and the EU?， THE DIPLOMAT (August 17， 2017)， 
htps:/thediplomat.com!2017 /08/a-new-g2-china -and-the-eu/. 
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direct investment (“FDI") and services.16“Both EU and Chinese leaders 
believe that effective rules-based multilateralism should form the core of 
global govemance."17 
The [European Union] and China have much in common. Their 
GDPs (~14.72 [$16.23] [CP1] trillion [rb2] and ~9.75 [$10.75] 
trillion， respectively， in 2015) rank number two and number 
three in the world， behind the United States (~16.64 trilion). 
They are two of the most extemally-integrated economies in the 
world， with annual international trade in goods and services of 
~15 trillion [$16.54 trilion] (~5 trillion [$5.51 trilion] if only 
trade external to the EU is considered) and ~4.75 trillion [$5.24 
trilion]， respectively， in 2015. Their annual bilateral trade in 
goods and services stood at ~580 [$640] billion in 2015， with 
each being the other's largest source of imports and second-
largest export destination. . . . [M]any areas of economic 
interaction remain under-developed， including trade in services， 
levels of foreign investment， cooperation on industrial and 
technological innovation， and financial market integration.18 
Cogent reasons exist for an EU-China FTA:19 1) the expanding trade 
potential;20 2) the growing and encroaching number of FTAs already setting 
the rules of trade (such as the CPTPP and CETA-with the RCEP and TTIP 
to follow) and the fact that the EU and China each have FTAs with some of 
16 See Countries and Regions:・China，supra note 10. 
17 Garcia-Herrero et al.， supra note 2， atvi. 
18 Id. (“Chinese imports of services grew at an average annual rate of more than 25 per cent between 
201 0 and 2015， and由eEU's位以lesurplus in services with China has been growing at an average annual 
rate of 37 per cent since 2010， reaching n 1 billion in 2015. . . . Growing Chinese consumption， especially 
of services， has the potential to create new markets for European businesses， while rising Chinese 
investment in the EU， in addition to increasing EU GDP and employment， also provides Chinese 
companies with a platform to improve their global competitiveness") 
19 JACQUES PELKMANS ET AL.， CTR. FOR EUR. POL'y STUD.， TOMORROW'S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING 
AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1-4 (2018) (outlining five arguments for an EU-China FTA: 
“greater economic potential， comparative market access， mega-regionals， the link between Chinese reforms 
and exposure to foreign competition， and strategic and geo-political advantages.") 
20 Id. at 1 (providing 2014 EU-China economic and trade indicators， including: (1) GDP:ぞ16，56.9
billion for the EU and t:9，014.7 billion for China; (2) GDP per capita: t:32，307.7 for the EU and t:6，468.2 
for China; (3) total bilateral trade in goods and services:ぞ518.8billion; (4) FDI-EU position with China 
(2013): outwardぞ130billion， inward ぞ27billion; (5) average applied tariffs in industry: 3.8% for the EU 
and 8% for China; and， (6) average applied tariffs in agro-food: 7.2% for the EU and 13.9% for China). 
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the same countries， e.g.， South Korea;21 3) China's continual economic 
reforms can adjust to the necessary accommodations for an FTA; 2 and， 4) 
the coming EU -China corridor of the BRI portends the need for some 
certainty in the EU-twenty-eight “rules of the road" in trade， including the 
related issues of labor standards.23 
Even with such cogent reasons for an FTA， many other practical 
trade-related issues need to be addressed， such as differences in systems 
(e.g.， legal24 and political) and standards (e.g.， labor)， and consistency in law 
enforcement， not to mention substantive issues of intellectual property， 
industry topics， etc. Additional obstacles stem from China's reportedly non-
transparent， exclusionary， and preferential trade practices.25 Prior EU-China 
disputes highlight areas that negotiators would need to address.26 
In 2016， due to China's trading practices on dumping， the EU 
Parliament members voted against the granting of market economy status 
(“MES") to China.27 An alliance of thirty European industrial associations， 
21 See Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?， supra note 6， at 8-12. See also 
Korea -Trade Agreements， EXPORT.GOV (Aug. 29， 2019)， https://www.export.gov/artic1e?id=Korea-Trade-
Agreements. 
22 PELKMANS ET AL.， supra note 19， at 2-3 (“The fundamenta1 connection is the drive to stimu1ate 
productivity growth over a 10ng period of time， after the curr・entmode1 of mass production based on 1ow-
skilled assemb1y and extreme export-1ed growth in such products has begun to run out of steam. Higher 
productivity growth trends a1so require better， more and higher-quality services， both domestically and as 
crucia1 e1ements in globa1 va1ue chains. Opening up the Chinese economy is therefore， in the mutua1 
interest of both the EU and China， and a deep pa但rt臼nershi甲pin the fi白ormofan am由bi凶tiousFT A seems the mos幻t 
expeditious way tωo achieve t由ha低ta創im.'刊')
2幻3 See generally M必inghaZhao仏， The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for China-Europe 
Re1ations， 51 THEINT'LSPECTATOR 109， 109-18 (2016). 
24 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE， 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRlliRS 94 (2017) (noting key areas that differ between the U.S. and China， inc1uding， 
“administrative licensing， competition policy， the treatment of [NGOs]， commercia1 dispute reso1ution， 
1abor 1aws and 1aws governing 1and use. Corruption among Chinese government officia1s， enab1ed in part 
by China's incomp1ete adoption of the ru1e of 1aw， isa1so a key concern."). 
25 See Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreemen何人 supranote 6， at17-21. 
26 See， e.g.， Viktoria Dendrinou， EU Files Complaint Versus China on Raw-Material Duties， 
MARKETW ATCH (Ju1y 19， 2016， 8:07 AM)， https://www.marketwatch.com!story/eu-fi1es-comp1aint-vs-
china-on-raw-materia1-duties-2016-07-19. See also EU Imposes Anti-Dumping Duties on Chinese Steel 
Products， XINHUA (October 8， 2016， 10:20 AM)， http://www.chinadai1y.com.cn/business/2016-
1O/08/content 26988038.htm. 
27 MEPs Vote Against Market Economy Status for China， EU BUSINESS (May 13， 2016)， 
http://www.eubusiness.com!news-eu!china-mes.121 ag (“In a non-1egis1ative reso1ution passed by 546 votes 
to 28， [the EU Parliament] said that unti1 China fu1fi1s由eEU's five criteria for m但・keteconomy status， its 
exports to the EU must be treated in a ‘non 
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AEGIS Europe， said the European Parliament's signal could not be clearer: 
“a fair partnership is only possible if China plays by the rules of free and fair 
intemational trade， and honors its WTO obligations."28 
Another significant issue is the European Union's domestic political 
situation. Of the EU's twenty-eight states， those already with “good trade 
deals" with China will be hesitant to support an EU substitute FTA (even 
though the EU may have the legal authority sign one under the Lisbon 
Treaty). Divergences among Member States' interests are especially 
significant in the forging of the European Union's coherent external 
strategy，29 and tensions between the European Union and its individual 
member states weaken the European Union's overall influence. In EU-China 
relations， these inconsistencies can be exploited. 
Member States will not easily be convinced to alter their 
relationships with China; their lack of motivation thus far 
proves as much. The relationships between the Member States 
and China are almost entirely economic in nature， therefore 
only unambiguous economic incentives can coax the EU out of 
its current highly nationalized approach to China. A 
comprehensive EU-China FTA would offer these crucial 
incenti ves. 30 
MANUFACTURERS FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016)， ht甲://www.tradeenforcement.org/market-economy-
status/ (“A 'non-market economy' is any foreign country that由eU.S. Department of Commerce 
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures. When this is the case， sales 
by the exporting country do not reflect fair value . . .ア);Why Doesn't China Qual祢?， MANUFACTURERS 
FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016)， http://www.tradeenforcement.org/why-china-doesnt-qualify/ (“China is 
stil a Non-Market Economy. While China has made a number of economic reforms in recent years， the 
Chinese economy remains fundamentally a non-market economic system dominated by the Communist 
Party and the state."). 
28 Nick Prag， MEPs Dej凶 dEU Industry Against China's Unfair Trade Practices， EU BUSINESS 
(May 12，2016， 10:25 PM)， http://www.eubusiness.com!Members/nickprag/china-trade-mes/. 
29 See generally Jing Men， The EU and China: Mismatched Partners?， 21 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 
333， 336 (2012). 
30 Zachary Haver， Rebalancing EU-China Relations: The Case戸ran EU-China FTA， WORLD 
ECON.， TRADE AND FIN. (Feb. 9， 2017)， https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com!blog/09/02/2017 /rebalancing-
eu-china -relations-case-eu -china -fta (“In general terms， given the enormous size of the EU -China economic 
relationship， any additional trade liberalization， especially reduction in non-tariff barriers， stands to benefit 
both parties. .. In negotiating as a supranational bloc， the EU-28 would have a greater degree of leverage 
to win concessions， and in turn would be able to collectively offer concessions of their own to China."). See 
also Michael Smith， EU Diplomacy and the EU-China Strategic Relationship: Framing， Negotiation and 
Management， 29 CAMBRIDGE REv. OF INT'L AFF. 78， 80-82 (2016); Lucie Qian Xia， So Far， So Close? 
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Another political-Iegal issue raised by an EU-China BIT is what will be the 
legal effect on the Member States' BITs with China? 
EU member states have since 1959 concluded 1，384 BITs with 
third countries. Regulation 1219/2012 foresees that in the long 
run al member state BITs are to be replaced by EU 
[Intemational Investment Agreements] [(“IIAs")] but does not 
set a specific time frame. The current EU negotiating agenda 
will replace a part of existing member states' BITs. . 
However， the ultimate replacement of al existing member 
states BITs with EU agreements will take time， and the high 
number of authorizations granted shows that member states 
remain active in negotiating BITs. . . . For al of these reasons， it 
can be expected that individual EU member states will continue 
to request to negotiate new treaties with third countries.31 
It is reported that“Germany has practically stopped negotiating new 
BITs because of the transfer of competency for FDI to the level of the 
European Union."32 More recently， the European Union's highest court， the 
EU-China Network Diplomacy， THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 17，2016)， ht恥://thedip1omat.comJ20 16/0 l/so-伽 -so-
c1ose-eu -china -network -di p10macy / 
31 Stefanie Schacherer， Can EU Member States Stil Negotiate BITs with Third Countries?， INT'L 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 10， 2016)， https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-member-states-
stil-negotiate-bi ts -wi th -third -coun町ies-stefanie-schacherer/(“Since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009， foreign direct investment (FDI) fals within the common commercia1 policy of the 
European Union and， as such， became part of the sphere of exc1usive competence of the European Union. 
The competence shift is evidenced by the negotiations of internationa1 investment agreements (IIAs) that 
由eEuropean Commission is conducting with a number of countries， inc1uding important economies， such 
as China and the United States. Against由isbackground， third countries may be surprised when invited by 
individua1 EU member states to start bi1atera1 investment町eaty(BIT) negotiations. Does EU 1aw allow 
member states to initiate BIT negotiations? On1y the European Union may 1egis1ate and adopt 1egally 
binding acts concerning areas within its exc1usive competence. EU member states may on1y do so 
themse1ves if empowered by the European Union. According1y， itfals to the European Union to decide 
whether to empower member states to conc1ude internationa1 treaties in fie1ds of exc1usive EU competence. 
This ‘re-empowerment' is usually adopted through secondary EU 1aw (for examp1e， EU regu1ations) and is 
often used to provide for transitiona1 arrangements concerning areas over which the European Union new1y 
acquired exc1usive competence."). 
32 Axe1 Berger， Investment Treaties and the Search 戸rMarket Access in China， INT'L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 26， 2013)， at n.1， https://www.iisd.org/itn!2013/06/26/investment-treaties-and-
由e-search-for-market -access-in-china! (“As new European investment treaties will rep1ace existing 
member state BITs the number of German BITs will even decrease in由eyears to come."). Once it enters 
into force， the new agreement will streamline the existing BITs between China and 27 of the 28 EU 
member states (al， except Ire1and). Chancellor Merke1 recent1y stated her support of an EU-China BIT. See 
China， Germany Agree to Speed Up Talks on China-EU Investment Agreen 
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European Court of Justice (“ECJ")， struck down an arbitration agreement 
contained within a BIT between two EU  Member States， the Netherlands 
and Slovakia， holding it was inconsistent with EU  law.33 Therefore， it is 
apparent the EU-China BIT will eventually displace the twenty-six existing 
bilateral agreements between China and E U  Members.
34 
Typical socio-economic issues are how FDI is used and the interaction 
between foreign owners and local workers. Chinese FDI and ownership in 
the European Union has raised concems in some cases;35 however， there are 
also positive results， as illustrated by Chinese FDI in Sweden (an EU  
Member State). Chinese investment has thus far been well received in 
Sweden， where government， business， labor and interest groups， and even 
the media have lauded Chinese investments for job creation and an increase 
in the production of Swedish goods and services.
36 
XINHUA (June 2， 2017)， http://www.xinhuanet.comJ/english/2017-06/02/c_136332689.htm (“Merkel said 
Germany attaches great attention to the EU -China investment treaty， a低叫ddingt由ha瓜tthe s討igningof the 町ea瓜ty
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU -Ch副1inaf台並記eetrade agr陀.右ee引me白nt.'刊')
3お3 See Ben J. Williams， European Court of Justice Rules that Arbitration Agreement in Intra-EU 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Violates EU Law Calling into Question the Arbitrability of Energy Disputes 
Between EU Member States， KING & SPALDING LLP (Apr. 9， 2018)， https://www.kslaw.com!blog-
posts/european-court-of.てjustice-rules-that-arbitration-agreement-in-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaty-
violates-eu-law-calling-into-question-the-arbitrability-of-energy-disputes-between-eu-member-states 
(noting that the ramifications of this judicial decision are uncertain but likely to impact not only intra-EU 
BITs but also multilateral investment treaties involving the EU and its member states). 
34 China-EU， BILATERALS.ORG (July 2014)， https://www.bilaterals.org/?-china-eu-. See also 
Schacherer， supra note 31 (“Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may only do so themselves if 
empowered by the European Union. Accordingly， itfals to the European Union to decide whether to 
empower member states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. This ‘re-
empowerment' is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example， EU regulations) and is often 
used to provide for transitional但Tangementsconcerning areas over which the European Union newly 
acquired exclusive competence."); FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers， 
EUROPEAN COMM'N， http://ec.europa.eu!citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq (last updated Oct. 30， 
2019). 
35 See Factbox: Chinese Investments in German Companies， REUTERS (Feb. 26， 2018)， 
ht甲s://www.reuters.comJarticle/us-daimler-geely-factbox/factbox-chinese-investments-in-german-
companies-idUSKCN1GA1RO. 
36 EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA (ETNC)， CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE: A 
COUNTRY LEVEL ApPROACH， 154-55 (John Seaman et al. eds.， 2017) (“According to China' s ambassador 
to Sweden， Chen Yumi 
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China's interaction with European workers and labor unions is quickly 
increasing in scale， and by many accounts appears positive. By the end of 
2016 in Italy，“more than 260 Chinese industrial and financial companies 
had invested in around 450 Italian businesses， which in total employ more 
than 25，000 workers."37 In Norway，38 national labor union representatives 
and some politicians initially resisted China Bluestar's (a.k.a.， ChemChina) 
acquisition of Elkem (a Norwegian silicone producer). Those resisting 
worried that a Chinese company， based in an authoritarian political system， 
would not respect the rights of Norwegian laborers. Yet， since the takeover 
was completed in 2011， Elkem's representatives have appeared on television 
regularly praising the company's new owners.39 
B. Pathway Agreements and Projects 
The clearest pathway to a successful bilateral FTA would build on the 
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that places an 
EU-China BIT40 as central to the European Union's long-term bilateral 
relations with China.41 The BIT would accelerate the process toward an FTA 
and create a more open and transparent environment for increased flows of 
investment. It would also improve investment for European and Chinese 
37 Id. at 84 
38 See ¥Torway-European Union Relations， WIKIPEDIA， 
ht甲s://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norway%E2%80%93European_Union_relations(last visited Dec. 1， 2019); 
Konstruktionstraktorer， Gravmaskin Bulldozer， BLOGSPOT (July 29， 2015)， 
ht甲:// gravmaskinbulldozer. blogspot.com!20 15/07 /norway-eu.html [https://perma.cc/82N6-CRJE] 
(“Although the Kingdom of Norway is not a member state of the European Union (EU)， itis closely 
associated with the Union through its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA)， by virtue of 
being a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFT A)， one of the historically two 
dominant western European" associations). 
39 EUROPEAN THINK-T ANK NETWORK ON CHINA， supra note 36， at105. 
40 See Berger， supra note 32 (the EU-China BIT has also been referred to as the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (“CAI") and the terms appear to have flexibility as the latter may omit some 
terms present in a BIT). For example， China has also negotiated preferential trade investment agreements 
(“PTIA")， of which four (with Pakistan， New Zealand， Peru， and ASEAN) included comprehensive rules 
on investment. The PTIA with Singapore incorporates the China-ASEAN investment agreement and the 
PTIA with Costa Rica (2010) reaffirms a previously-signed China-Costa Rica BIT (2007). The PTIA 
recently signed with Iceland follows this approach and recognizes the importance (Art. 92) of the China-
Iceland BIT from 1994). See Iuliu Winkler， EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-
China CAI)， EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Oct. 20， 2019)， ht甲://www.europarl.europa.eu!legislative-
町ain/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-china-investment-
agreement. 
41 See EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda‘for Cooperation， EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 23， 2013)， 
ht甲://eeas.europa.eu!archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.
DECEMBER 2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 73 
investors by creating investment rights and guaranteeing non-discrimination， 
improving transparency， and providing investment rules on environmental-
and labor-related aspects of foreign investment， as al are potential obstacles 
to agreement of an FTA.42 
As the BIT will likely replace existing bilateral agreements between 
China and EU member states， the groundwork for an eventual EU-China 
FTA will already exist and could be integrated as was done in CETA and in 
the EU-Vietnam FTA.43 In 2013， the European Union carried out a 
“Sustainability Impact Assessment" to assess the potential economic， social， 
environmental， and human rights impact of the BIT agreement and， among a 
number of conclusions， determined that forward FDI from the European 
Union into China has a positive impact on employment and labor conditions 
in China.44 
In 2014， China， supported by the European Union， joined the U.S.-Ied， 
on-going negotiations towards a global Trade in Services Agreement 
(“TiSA") that seeks to open markets and improve rules.45 
The [TiSA] is a trade agreement currently being negotiated by 
23 members of the [WTO] ， including the EU. Together， the 
participating countries account for 70% of world trade in 
services. TiSA is based on the WTO's General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS)， which involves al WTO members. 
The key provisions of the GATS-scope， definitions， market 
access， national treatment and exemptions-are also found in 
TiSA. TiSA aims at opening markets and improving rules in 
areas such as licensing， financial services， telecoms， e-
commerce， maritime transport， and professionals moving 
abroad temporarily to provide services. There is no formally set 
deadline for ending the negotiations.46 
42 Id. See also Countries and Regions:・China，supra note 10. 
43 PELKMANS ET AL.， supra note 19， at5. 
44 See Impact Assessment Report on the EU-China Investment Relations， EUROPEAN COMM'N 
(May 23， 2013)， at 45-46， http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regu1ation/impact!ia_carried_out/docs/ia_20 13/swd_20 13 _0185 _en. pdf. 
45 Trade in Services Agreement， EUROPEAN COMM'N， ht甲:// ec. europa. eu/trade/policy /in -focus/tisa/ 
(last updated Ju1y 14，2017). See also Donnan & Byrne， supra note 1. 
46 Trade in Services Agreement， supra note 45; see also Donnan & Byrne， supra note 1. See also 
Berger， supra note 32， atn. 7; THE WORLD BANK， CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN， HARMONIOUS， AND 
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And， there is a working group from high levels of both govemments， 
underscoring the seriousness of the work; the EU-China Trade Project I 
(“EUCTP I")， works on the many substantive issues of an EU-China FTA 
and suggests appropriate positions and accommodations to support China's 
continued integration into the global trading system.47 EUCTP I will hold 
approximately 400 individual activities， organized under five linked 
components covering 40 technical files: (1) trade in services; (2) quality 
infrastructure and technical barriers to trade; (3) agriculture and SPS; (4) 
customs and trade related regulatory systems; and， (5) cross-cutting 
policies.48 This is the third project since 2000 that seeks to create a more 
open EU-China pathway. However， this program expands on previous 
attempts by promoting fair competition and value for consumers; facilitating 
harmonization with intemational standards and promoting safe products; 
improving food safety and quality; modernizing customs; and encouraging a 
more transparent legal environment with work towards transparency， good 
govemance， and sustainable development. 49 
C. EU and Chinese Labor Standards and Dispute Resolution 
To the su中riseof many， a recent study suggests that there may not be 
so many differences between Chinese labor standards of workers and those 
of some EU States.50 A study of Foxconn in the Czech Republic shows that 
the practices of using temporary workers， maintaining low labor costs， and 
restricting trade unions resemble Chinese practices.51 Of course， this is a 
CREATIVE SOClliTY 389 (ο20削13町)(The re叩po側r口t
Deve10pment Research Center of the State Counci江1，one of the most inf1uentia1 Chinese think tanks on 
economic policy is乱叩ues，calls for a 負白1rt由heぽrliberalization of investment restrictions， and especially highlights 
the importance of market access provisions to be inc1uded in future Chinese investment treaties). 
47 See Car1 Hayward， Trading Places: The EU-China Trade Project， EUROBIZ (May 30， 2014)， 
https:/ /www.eurobiz.com.cnltrading -p1aces-eu -china -trade-proj ect. 
48 See Project Overview， EU-China Trade Project I， EUROPEAN COMM'N， 
http://www .eeas.europa.eu!archives/de1egations/china/documents/news/20110324_0 Len.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 1，2019); Hayward， supra note 47. See also GARcIA-HERRERO ET AL.， supra note 2， at59-67. 
49 See Project Overview， EU-China Trade Project I， supra note 48. 
50 Rutvica Andrijasevic， Made Within/Outside the EU: What's the D(万台rence人UNI.LEICESTER SCH. 
OF Bus. BLOG (June 11， 2014)， https://staffb1ogs.1e.ac.uk/management/2014/06/11/made-withinoutside-the-
eu -whats-the-difference/. 
51 See id. (In 2015，“in the Czech Republic， the firm achieves f1exibility by emp10ying 40 percent of 
its workforce through temporary work agencies. These indirect1y emp10yed 1aborers-primari1y EU 
mlgrants 台omSlovakia， Po1and， Romania and Bu1garia-work 12-hour shifts during the peak production 
periods and are transported back to由eircountries of origin when work is scarce. They are hired on short-
term contracts and are given notice of their shifts a week in advance at best， but often 1earn if they have 
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mere snapshot and there is a much larger picture of employment profiles and 
legal standards and approaches regulating labor that show wide gulfs within 
the EU Member States and between EU Member States and China.52 A 
recent publication finds that electronics f白lr口msin Eastern European countries 
often use employment practices resembling those in mainland China一 aso-
called 
This evolution of Chinese investment in Eastem Europe has had an impact 
on working rights and conditions of European workers employed in the 
electronics sector， especially in Eastem Europe. 
Beijing was beginning to pour money and political capital into 
Eastem and Central Europe as part of a broad bid to increase its 
heft in Europe. China's leaders see the region as potentially 
fertile ground. . . . Looking for further inroads， China started 
what came to be called the 16+ 1 initiati ve， an effort to expand 
cooperation with more than a dozen Eastem and Central 
European nations. It became a forum for China to show off 
what it could offer the region， like access to technology for a 
high-speed rail system. Mr. Xi later included Eastem and 
Central Europe in his Belt and Road lnitiative， an ambitious 
plan to develop economic and diplomatic ties through 
infrastructure projects around the world.54 
work on the same day. Furthermore， they are paid t:2-2.5 per hour compared to directly employed workers 
who are paid t:3-3.5 per hour . . . . In the Czech Republic， where位以leunions are plant-based，由eumon 
tends to only be concerned with issues concerning directly employed workers， the majority of whom are 
Czech nationals. This de facto exclusion is done to protect the interests of the domestic workers， who 
benefit from the presence of temporary EU migrants because the latter group absorbs fluctuations in the 
demand for labor."). 
52 See Agnes Parent-Thirion， etal.， Eurofound， Sixth European Working Conditions Survey (2017); 
see also John Hurley， etal.， Eurofound & European Comm'n Joint Research Ctr.， European Jobs Monitor 
2019: Shifts in the Employment Structure at Regional Level (2019). 
53 European Trade Union Institute (ETUI)， China-isation 01 Working Conditions and Workers' 
Rights in Europe， MEDIUM (Oct. 7， 2016)， https://medium.comJ@ETUCorg/eletronicsineurope-
f413df96297b (listing comprehensive comparative wages and benefits for workers in the electronics 
industries in Hungary， Czechia， and Turkey， working for Foxconn， Flextronics， Nokia， and Samsung; they 
are al similarly low). 
54 David Barboza et. al.， China Seeks lnfluence in Europe， One Business Deal at a Time， N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12， 2018)， https://nyti.ms/2MmEm9w. The 16+ 1 format is an initiative by the People's Republic of 
China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries: 
Albania， Bosnia， and Herzegovina， Bulgaria， Croatia， the Czech Republic， Estonia， Hungary， Latvia， 
Lithuania， Macedonia， Montenegro， Poland， Romania， Serbia， Slovakia， and Slovenia. See “16+1" Summit 
Has Concluded， COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRlliS 
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Notwithstanding the above regional wage disparities， the general 
wage gap between Chinese and European workforces in recent years has 
narrowed and diminished the competitive cost advantage that China has 
enjoyed in the past. To better compete， China seeks to mitigate losing its 
competitive edge due to its rising wages by developing automation and using 
robots in many economic sectors under its Made in China 2025 
robotization/digitalization initiative.55 Stil， in 2017， the following was 
reported: 
China's median net salary is now equal to parts of Europe， and 
higher than some Eastem European countries， due to its new 
minimum wage standards. Factory workers in China are eaming 
more than ever as average hourly wages have gone up a 
significant 64% since 201l. The trend is expected to continue as 
salaries for both blue and white-collar workers are expected to 
grow by 7% this year alone. Wage increases are beneficial for 
Chinese workers as they rise to the level of various European 
countries. Median wages in Shanghai (事1，135) are now 
comparable to Hungary (事1，139)，Prague (事1，400)and Poland 
($1，569). Yet China's status as a global manufacturing hub-
due in most part to its cheap labor-will likely be impacted. 
The improved wages for workers may result in a loss of the 
(Nov. 11， 2016)， http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2016日/hdxw4/t1414327.htm. Moreover， the 
China-Europe express rai1way route has become a key channe1 of 1and町ansportationin the globa11ogistics 
m但・ketand is an important link between China and CEEC. See also “16+ 1" Mechanism Set to Bolster 
China-Europe Ties， COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRlliS 
(Ju1. 10， 2018) ht甲://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1575579.htm.Guidedby previous China-CEEC 
summits， the 16+ 1 mechanism has deve10ped into an important channe1 for凶 ns-regiona1cooperation and 
an eye-catching p1atform of open multi1atera1 cooperation， which is wide1y seen as conducive to 
collaboration between China and the EU. In recent ye但.s，there has been steady growth in economic 
cooperation and町adebetween China and CEE countries， with two-way trade reaching $67.98 billion in 
2017， up 15.9 percent from由eprevious year， according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Premier Li 
a1so said China expects to 呂町ivefor pragmatic results in advancing China-EU bi1atera1 investment 町eaty
(“BIT") negotiations and dealing with c1imate change so as to joint1y upho1d multi1ateralism， promote 
liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment and safeguard wor1d peace， stability and 
deve1opment. 1d. 
55 See Rona1d C. Brown， Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Digitalization on 
MNC Labor Supp1y Chains and Workers' Labor Rights in China， 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 186， 186 
(2017). 
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country's competitive edge to labor pools in Eastem Europe and 
other Asian countries.56 
77 
The parity and diversity between the European Union and China 
suggest there is common ground to discuss FTA rules affecting labor issues. 
It also reinforces the need to understand the diversity of labor standards in 
China and within the EU Member S tates. 
Labor unions of course have much interest in intemational trade not 
undermining labor rights and opportunities. In 2013， Switzerland became 
the first European economy (though not an EU Member) to sign an FTA 
with China， which contained labor provisions and demonstrates China is 
open to including such terms.57 It is reported that interesting political 
controversy accompanied the negotiation process in that the “Swiss Business 
Federation and the ‘political right' were [anxious] to secure privileged 
access to the massive Chinese market ahead of al the competitors in the EU 
countries，58 and advocated disregarding human and labor rights to obtain 
that competitive edge.59 Ultimately， though the final agreement contains a 
weak monitoring system with no penalties the “political right" lost the 
argument to exclude labor standard protections.60 There was sentiment that 
the labor provision did not go far enough and only delivered a glass “half-
empty[.]"61 However， while Swiss labor unions initially opposed the weak 
labor standards， they later reversed their position and supported the FTA 
(even though labor accommodations were lacking) when they determined 
advantages were gained. Swiss trade unions decided that the officiallinkages 
under the agreement to facilitate cooperation between unions in Switzerland 
56 China's Wages are Catching 叩 to Europe， GLOBAL UPSIDE (Sept. 4， 2017)， 
ht甲://www.globalupside.com!chinas-wages-are-catching-up-to-europe/ (“Over the last decade， the 
European Union (EU) has taken steps to integrate this pool of cheap labor into the global workforce. 
However， as the Eastern European and Chinese workforces compete， a low-wage ceiling has formed; these 
two labor pools have come to determine the cost of low-skill labor worldwide. Despite Croatia becoming 
the newest EU member， the median net salary in Shenzhen， Bei討jingand Shanghai are al hi泡ghe白r由an1 
Croa低油tia.'刊')
5灯7 Pe氏吋drina& Doka， s川upranote 5. Icela創nc叫dfollowed as a second Eu町1江ropeanstate tωo s討ignan FT A with 
Ch副1Ina.See Europe FTAs， BILATERALS.ORG， https://www.bilaterals.org/?-europe-ftas (last updated May 
2012) (Iceland is not an EU Member but is a member of EFTA) 
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and China， as well as the opportunity to educate the companies and workers 
regarding labor standards， were worthy of their support. 62 The unions 
perceived the gains as follows: 
[T]he preamble to the FTA cites the protocol of understanding 
reached between Switzerland and China in 2007 on what is 
termed a “human rights dialogue". In addition， both sides 
confirm their commitment to upholding the UN Charter， which 
is the basis for the subsequently elaborated UN human rights 
instruments. Regarding ILO core standards， both countries 
commit to respecting those that have been ratified; China has 
ratified only 4 (excluding the standards protecting freedom of 
association and prohibiting forced labor). This is highly 
problematic. However， the agreement does contain a reference 
to both parties' obligations arising from membership of the ILO 
and from the major ILO declarations on labor rights and social 
justice， observing al 8 core standards.63 
In further support of labor cooperation， a recent joint study on 
Europe's and China's future employment challenges by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (“CASS") and the Directorate General for 
Employment， Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European 
Commission concluded there is a shared need to upgrade the labor skils of 
existing workers.64 
It is also noteworthy that the EU -China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation， inits EU -China BIT negotiations， set a goal to negotiate “rules 
on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign investment."65 
Certainly issues of trade unions and workers' organizational rights under the 
ILO core labor standards will need to be addressed， along with decisions 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See CAI F ANG & XA  VlliR PRATS MONN丘EUROPEANCOMM'N， NEW SKILLS FOR NEW JOBS: CHINA 
AND THE EU 25-26 (2012) (“Both China and the EU share a common aim to upskill the labor force and 
recognize由atthe majority of those that need upskilling are already in work. It is a challenging task to 
ensure由atindividuals have access to and actually take up training and that the relevant stakeholders 
understand由eneed to provide accessible training to existing workers.") 
65 Countries and Regions: China， supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
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made about including those rights in a Social Dimension provision in an EU-
China FTA.66 
II. LEGAL: CURRENT LABOR OBLIGATIONS 
This section will address the labor obligations， or lack thereof， China 
and EU members have formed through BITs and FTAs. 
A. China 
While Chinese BITs have not addressed labor concerns， several FTAs 
with attached MOUs do， though the substance and enforcement are weak. 
This section will outline and analyze the current labor standard agreements 
China has made with other countries. 
1. BITs 
Current China BITs，67 generally， and specifically those with EU 
Member States do not contain labor protections or references to ILO 
standards.68 It is not uncommon for a BIT to precede an FTA， and BITs often 
are incorporated into later FTAs. It was recently noted that as“a precursor to 
their [FTA] negotiations， which launched in March 2013， China， Japan， and 
Korea (“CJK") signed a trilateral investment agreement in May 2012." 69 
The agreement aims to set the ground-work for greater 
regulatory transparency， a more predicable policy environment， 
and a liberalized investment regime in order to facilitate 
66 INT'L LABOR ORG.， SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 4 (rev. ed. 2015) (social 
dimension provisions in FT As include ILO labor standards) 
67 See UN Investment Policy Hub: Terminology， INV. POLICY HUB， 
ht甲://investmen甲olicyhub.unctad.orgIIIA/mappedContent#iialnnerMenu (click on drop-down 
“Terminology+" in left-hand menu) (“International investment agreements (IIAs) are divided into two 
types: (1) bilateral investment treaties and (2) treaties with investment provisions). A bilateral investment 
町eatyis an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection of investments made by 
investors from respective countries in each other' s territory. The great majority of IIAs are BITs. 
68 See Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations， EUROPEAN COMM'N (Nov. 2019)， 
http://町ade.ec.europa.eu!doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf;see also UN Investment Policy 
Hub: Terminology， supra note 66. 
69 Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino， The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement: 
Implications for US Policy and the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaη， Tow ARD A US-CHINA 
INVESTMENT TREATY 6， 6 (Peterson Inst. Int'印 conomics2015) (ebook). 
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intraregional [FDI] (CJK Joint Study Committee 2011).70 
German Chancellor Merkel recently stated her support of an 
EU-China BIT;“Germany attaches great attention to the EU-
China investment treaty， adding that the signing of the treaty 
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU-China free trade 
agreement."71 
The European Union， itself， has a number of BITs， none of which 
include labor provisions (though， as discussed below， several EU members' 
agreements include labor terms). As the European Union and Chinese trade 
relationship continues to grow， it is also expected that FDI will increase for 
both parties. This will result in greater interaction with workers and foreign 
labor unions and increase the need for attention to labor issues and labor 
union cooperation.72 Meanwhile， the negotiations for an EU-China BIT 
continue.73 It will replace the twenty-six existing Bilateral Investment 
Treaties between the twenty-seven individual EU member states and China 
with a single comprehensive investment agreement. 74 
70 See Agreement Among the Government of Japan， the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Promotion， Facilitation and Protection of 
Investment， May 13， 2012， Japanese Ministry of Economy， Trade and Industry， 
https:/ /www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/20 12/5/pdfs/0513_0 L01.pdf. See also Significantly Enhanced 
Protection‘for Korean Investors Achieved Through Amendment of Korean-China Investment Protection 




71 Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement to Speed Up， BILATERALS.ORG (June 2， 2017)， 
https://www.bilaterals.org/?talks-on-china-eu-in vestment. 
72 EUROPEAN THINK-T ANK NETWORK ON CHINA， supra note 36， at154-55. 
73 Overview ofthe FTA and Other Trade Negotiations， supra note 68 (the 18th round of negotiations 
took place in Brussels on July 12-13， 2018). 
74 Id. (In 2016 the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and 
comprehensive scope for the EU-China investment agreement and established ajoint negotiating text). 
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2. FTAs75 
a. Past Practice 
One survey revea1s that in mid-2015“there were 13 [Chinese] FTAs，" 
of which eight 1ack 1abor protection provisions (ASEAN， Asia-Pacific， Costa 
Rica， Hong Kong， Macau， Pakistan， Singapore， and Taiwan) whi1e five 
include 1abor protection standards (Chi1e， Ice1and， New Zea1and， Peru， and 
Switzerland).76 Of these 1atter five FTAs， substantive 1abor provisions can 
75 See generally Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?， supra note 6. See also Jay 
Chittooran， What Do Chinese Rules Mean戸rWorker Rights?， THIRD WAY (Apr. 14， 2015)， 
ht甲s://www.thirdway.org/report!what-do-chinese-ru1es-mean-for-worker-rights.(Arguab1y， there 但・e16 
FTAs， as China had three other FTAs negotiated and in effect (with Taiwan， South Korea and Thai1and) but 
由eyhave not yet been notified to the WTO. None of these three contain a Socia1 Dimension provision with 
1abor protections); Free Trade Agreements (China)， ASIAN REG'L INTEGRATION CTR.， 
https://aric.adb.org/fta-coun町y(由eagreement with Taipei is an Economic Cooperation Agreement); 
People's Republic 01 China-Taipei， China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement， ASIAN REG'L 
INTEGRATION CTR.， ht甲s://aric. adb. org/fta/peop1es_republic _ oL china-
taipeichina_economic_cooperation_framework_agreement (signed and in effect， not yet notified to WTO); 
People's Republic 01 China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement， ASIAN REG'L INTEGRATION CTR.， 
https://aric.adb.org/fta/peop1es-republic-of -china -thai1and-台ee-trade-agreement(signed and in effect but 
not yet notified to由eWTO); People's Republic 01 China-Republic 01 Korea Free Trade Agreement， ASIAN 
REG'L INTEGRATION CTR.， https://aric.adb.org/fta!peop1es-republic-of-china-japan-korea-free-trade-
agreement (signed and in effect but not yet notified to the WTO); Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the Peop1e's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea， June 1， 
2015， China-S. Kor.， Ministry of Commerce of the Peop1e's Republic of China， 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea!annex/xdzw_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Korea FT A]. 
76 See China FTA Network， MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA， 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn!topic/enperu.shtm1 (many sections in Chinese on1y). The 13 agreements are: Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement， Nov. 2， 2005， Ministry of Commerce of the Peop1e's Republic of China， 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn!yatai/xieyiwenben_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/Y82T -9M2Y]; Main1and and Hong 
Kong C10ser Economic Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA")， June 29， 2003， China-H.K.， Hong Kong 
Specia1 Admin. Region Trade and Indus. Dep't， ht甲s://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/fi1es/main_ e. pdf; 
Main1and and Macao C10ser Economic Partnership Arrangement， D 
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only be found in the Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU")， not in the 
texts of the FTAs. These provisions' levels of protection range widely. In the 
China-Iceland FTA the parties agree to enhanced labor communication and 
cooperation.77 In other agreements， such as those with New Zealand and 
Switzerland， the parties reaffirm their obligations under the ILO， recognize 
that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
failing to enforce labor laws， and that it is inappropriate to set or use labor 
laws， regulations， policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes 
(though there is no enforcement mechanism).78 Thus， in essence， the parties 
agreed that they had ratified some ILO conventions and agreed to cooperate 
and consult if they disagree on their respective implementations of 
obligations. This type of provision is arguably comparable with the “soft 
law" approaches of co中oratesocial responsibility and codes of conduct， 
where parties are under no enforceable legal obligations.79 
b. EU Member States 
Currently， there are no FTAs between EU states and China. 
4JAY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of New Zealand， Apr. 7， 2008， China-N.Z.， N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade， 
ht甲s://www.mfat.govt.nz/assetsIFT Asagreements-in-force/China -FT AINZ-ChinaFT A -Agreement -text. pdf 
[https://perma. cc/Q8JL-GBP6] [hereinafter China-New Zealand FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the People's Republic of China， 
Nov. 24， 2006， China-Pak.， United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev.， 
ht甲://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2738 [https://perma.cc/8MEX-D6V3]; Free 
Trade Agreement Between由eGovernment of the People's Republic of China and由eGovernment of the 
Republic of Singapore Trade Agreement， Oct. 28， 2008， China-Sing.， Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China， http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml[https://perma.cc/S6EP-
6SAQ]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of Peru， Apr. 28，2009， art. 161， China-Peru， Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic 
of China， http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu!annex!bilu_xdwb_en.pdf[https://perma.cc/X3PC-A244]; Cross-
Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement， June 29， 2010， China-Taiwan， World Treaty Org. 
Reg'l Trade Agreements Info. Sys.， https://www.bilaterals.orgIIMG/pdfIECFA.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G6ZD-VLLB]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of Iceland， Apr. 15， 2013， art. 96， China-Ice.， Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China， http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/iceland/xieyi/2013-4-17 -en.pdf 
[https://perma.ccIPY5F-35DA] [hereinafter China-Iceland FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
People's Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation， July 6， 2013， China-Switz.， Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China， http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enswiss.shtml 
[ht甲s://perma.cc/2J4R-3YPC][hereinafter China-Swiss FTA] 
77 See China-Iceland FTA， supra note 76 
78 See， e.g.， China-New Zealand FTA， supra note 76. 
79 Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?， supra note 6， at14-17 
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c. Non-EU-Member States80 
i) China-Switzerland FTA 81 
The 2013 Switzerland-China FTA contains minimal language 
regarding labor standards. Chapter 13.5， Economic and Technical 
Cooperation， refers to the 2011 and the 2013 China-Swiss Memoranda of 
Understanding on Labor.82 The labor provisions in the 2013 MOU are 
summarized as follows: 
l. Source of standards: 
a. Parties reaffirm the obligations of China and Switzerland 
as members of the ILO， including their commitments 
under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up.83 
b. Parties reaffirm the obligations Ministerial Declaration of 
the UN Economic and Social Council on Full 
Employment and Decent Work of 2006， to recognizing 
ful and productive employment and decent work for al 
as a key element of sustainable development. 84 
c. The Parties reaffirm the ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization adopted by the 
Intemational Labor Conference at its 97th session in 
2008.85 
2.0bligations: 
a. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the 
80 See Ronald C. Brown， Asian and U.S. Perspectives on Labor Rights under International Trade 
Agreements Compared， in GIβBAL GOVERNANCE OF LABOUR RIGHTS 83， 96-112 (Axel Marx， Jan 
Wouters， Glenn Rayp & Laura Beke， eds.， 2015) (discussing differences of approach in the use of labor 
provisions by Asian countries and many developed western countries) 
81 See China-Swiss FTA， supra note 76 
82 See Agreement on Labour and Employment Cooperation Between the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs， Education and Research of the Swiss Confederation and the Minis町YOf Human 
Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic Of China， July 6， 2013， Swiss-China， 
ChinaGoAbroad Limited， ht甲://files.chinagoabroad.comIPublic/uploads/v2/uploaded/attachments/1402/
Agreement +on+Labour+and+ Employment. pdf (由e2013 MOU also referenced an earlier more generally-
worded 2011 MOU). 
83 Id. art. 2(1). 
84 Id. art. 2(2). 
85 Id. art. 2(4). 
84 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29No.l 
protections afforded in domestic labor laws， regulations， 
policies and practices in China and Switzerland.86 
b. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or use 
domestic labor laws， regulations， policies and practices 
for trade protectionist purposes.87 
c. The Parties will effectively enforce their respective 
domestic labor laws. 8 
d. Article 3(2) of 2013 MOU refers to 2011 MOU 
Cooperative activities that shall be conducted and may， 
inter alia， be implemented through: 
i. Dialogue， exchange of information and best 
pract1ces 
i. Meetings， visits， and workshops of experts 
111. Joint studies 
iv. Joint initiatives in multilateral organizations 
v. Cooperation projects and capacity building 
e. Each Party shall appoint a coordinator as contact point 
for implementation of the MOU89 
3. Dispute resolution 
a.“Should any issue arise over the interpretation or 
application of this Agreement， a Party may request 
consultations with the other Party through the contact 
points. The Parties will make every effort to reach 
consensus on the matter through cooperation， 
consultation and dialogue."9o 
b.“This Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day 
upon the issue of the latter notification. It shall remain in 
force indefinitely unless either Party gives notification of 
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i) China-Iceland FTA92 
Ice1and is not technically an EU Member though it does share many 
common undertakings.93 The 2013 Ice1and-China FTA has no substantive 
1abor standards. The on1y reference to 1abor is found in Chapter 9， Article 
96， Labor and Environment Cooperation， where the parties agree to enhance 
communication and cooperation on 1abor matters.94 
“1. The Parties shall enhance their communication and co-
operation on 1abor matters. 2. The Parties will further enhance 
communication and co-operation in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmenta1 Protection 
Cooperation between the State Environmenta1 Protection 
Administration of the Peop1e's Repub1ic of China and the 
Ministry for the Environment of Ice1and."95 
92 See China-Iceland FTA， supra note 76. 
93 See Agreement on the European Economic Area， May 2， 1992， 1994 0.1. (L 1) 3 (entered into 
force Jan. 1， 1994).“The Agreement on the European Economic Area， which entered into force on 1 
January 1994， brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States - Iceland， 
Liechtenstein and Norway - in a single market， referred to as由e‘InternalMarket.'" EEA Agreement， 
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA)， https://www.efta.int!eea!eea-agreement (last visited Dec. 1， 
2019). In March 2015 Iceland's government requested that “Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate 
country for EU membership." Iceland， EUROPEAN COMM'N， https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/iceland_en (last updated Nov. 22， 2017). The 
Agreement includes close cooperation in areas such as research and development， education， social policy， 
the environment， consumer protection， enterprise， tourism and culture. Iceland and the EU. EEA 
Agreement， supra note 93. 
94 China-Iceland FTA supra note 76. 
95 Id. Regarding the MOU， a communication， dated 5 September 2016， was circulated at the request 
of the delegations of Iceland and China. The communication included questions to the parties and their 
answers， including one由atread:“In 2005， China and Iceland have signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Environmental Protection Cooperation (MOU). In the China and Iceland FTA， both 
parties have reiterated the willingness to further promote communication and cooperation according the 
MOU. All these actions have facilitated the personnel exchanges and information communication between 
parties. China and Iceland are willing to promote the cooperation of labor and environment under the 
China-Iceland FTA， especially in the area of nature resource protection， environmental industry and 
technics， etc." Free Trade Agreement Between Iceland and China (Goods and Services) Questions and 
Replies， 
W ORLD TRADE ORG.， https:/ /docsonline. wto.org/do12felPagesIFE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=230995，229840，127699&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=O&FullTextH 
ash= (last visited Dec. 1，2019) 
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ii) China-Chile FTA96 
The labor provisions are contained in a 2005 MOU， which can be seen 
to be somewhat strong in substantive obligations， but very weak in 
enforcement. 97 
l. Source of standard~: The Parties shall carry out mutually agreed 
co-operation activities， more particularly in the following 
fields: 
a. employment and labor policies and social dialogue， 
including decent work， labor laws and labor inspection; 
b. improvement of working conditions and workers 
位ammg;
c. globalization and its impact on employment， the working 
environment， industrial relations and govemance， social 
security.98 
2.0bligation~: Co-operation between the Parties shall more 
particularly be carried out by means of: 
a. exchanges of information and expertise in the fields 
covered by the Memorandum; 
b. reciprocal visits of experts and delegations; 
c. joint organization of seminars， workshops and meetings 
for experts， regulatory authorities and other persons 
concemed; 
d. consultations within the framework of multilateral 
discussions on employment， training， labor and social 
security issues.9 
96 See China-Chile FTA， supra note 76 (“The Parties shall enhance their communication and 
cooperation on labor， social security and environment through both the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Labor and Social Security Cooperation， and the Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the 
Parties.") 
9切7 Memorandum of Understanding on Labour and Social Secu町凶rit旬yCooperation between the Ministry 
of Labou町rand Social Secu町ri江tyof the People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security of The Republic of Chile， Nov. 2， 2005， China-Chile， Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys.， 
http://www . sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL_ CHN/N egotiations/MOU _e.pdf [hereinafter China -Chile MOU on 
Labour and Social Security Cooperation]. 
98 Id. art. 1. 
99 Id. art. 2. 
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“Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required to support 
co-operation acti vities and shall undertake the co-ordination of the 
departments responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum." 10。
3. Dispute Resolutions: 
a. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the 
rights and obligations of the Parties resulting from any 
intemationallegal instrument. 101 
iv) China-NのvZealand FTA 1ω 
The labor provisions are contained in a 2008 MOU， which has good 
substantive obligations but weak enforcement. 103 
1. Source of Standards:“The Parties reaffirm their obligations as 
members of the ILO， including their commitments under the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and its Follow-up."104 
2.0bligations: 
100 Id. art. 4. 
101 Id. art. 5 
a.“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or 
use their labor laws， regulations， policies and practices 
for trade protectionist purposes."105 
b. 
encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing 
the protections afforded in domestic labor laws， 
regulations， policies and practices." 106 
c.“Each Party may， as appropriate， invite the participation 
of its unions and employers and/or other persons and 
102 China-New Zealand FTA， supra note 78， art. 177. 
103 See Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation， 2008， N.Z.-China， N.Z. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade， https:/ /www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FT As-agreements-in-force/China-FT AINZ-
China-FTA-Labour-MOU.pdf [hereinafter N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation]. The factor of an 
Asian coun町ynegotiating with a Western developed coun町Yis discussed in Brown， Asian and U.S. 
Perspectives on Labor Rights Under International Trade Agreements Compare， in Protecting Labor Rights 
in a Globalizing World， supra note 80， at96-12. 
104 N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation， art. 1(1). 
105 Id. art. 1(3). 
106 Id. art. 1 (4). 
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organizations of their countries in identifying potential 
areas for cooperation and in undertaking cooperative 
acti vities." 107 
d. Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required 
to support cooperation activities and shall undertake the 
coordination for the implementation of this 
Memorandum of Understanding. 108 
3. Disoute Resolution: 
a.“Should any issue arise over the interpretation or 
application of this Memorandum of Understanding， a 
Party may request consultation with the other Party， 
through the coordinator. The Parties will make every 
effort to reach a consensus on the matter through 
cooperation， consultation and dialogue."109 
り China-PeruFTA 
The labor provisions are contained in Article 161， Labor Cooperation， 
of the 2009 MOU: "[t]he Parties shall enhance their communication and 
cooperation on labor， social security and environment issues through 
Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation between the 
Govemment of the People's Republic of China and the Govemment of the 
Republic of Peru." 1 10 
B. The European Union 
The European Union currently has no FTA or BIT with China， though， 
as discussed above， it is negotiating with China for a BIT and planning for 
an FTA.ll1 The new EU-China BIT “will replace the 26 existing Bilateral 
Investment Treaties between 27 individual EU Member States and China by 
107 Id. art. 2(4). 
108 Id. art. 3(3). 
109 Id. art. 4(1). 
110 See China-Chile FTA， supra note 76. The author was unable to locate a separate Labor 
Cooperation MOU. See Trade Policy Developments: Peru-China， ORG. OF AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE 
INFO. SYS.， http://www.sice.oas.orgtrPD/PER_CHN/PER_CHN_e.ASP (last visited Dec. 1， 2019). The 
au由orwas unable to locate a separate Labor Cooperation MOU for Peru-China 
111 See also Overview 01 FTA and Other Trade Negotiations， supra note 68， at 9 (the 18th round of 
negotiations took place in Brussels 台omJuly12-13，2018). 
DECEMBER 2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 89 
one single comprehensive investment Agreement."112 In addition to BITs 
and FTAs， the European Union also negotiates treaties called Association 
Agreements that can also contain commitments regarding labor protections， 
as discussed below. 
1. Association Agreements 
The European Union has more than twenty Association Agreements 
(“AA")，113 including with Ukraine， Georgia， and Moldova.114 An AA has 
been defined as follows: 
a treaty between the European Union and a non-EU country that 
creates a framework for co-operation between them. Its legal 
basis is defined in Article 217 of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)， which provides for “an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations， common 
action and special procedures.115 
Under treaty powers， the European Union is authorized “to conclude 
with one or more third countries or intemational organizations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations， 
common action and special procedure." 116 Article 217 states they are 
112 Overview 01 FTA and Other Trade Negotiations， supra note 68， at10 (in 2016 the EU and China 
negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and comprehensive scope for the EU-China 
investment agreement and established a joint negotiating text). 
113 See Association Agreements， INST. FOR GOV'T (Mar. 22， 2018)， 
ht甲s://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ explainers/association -agreements “Association agreements 
were originally created by the EU to prepare non-member countries for accession. The very first such 
agreement was signed by Greece in 1961. But the EU has since used these agreements for far wider 
reasons， from improving trade with non-member countries such as Morocco， to developing deeper， lon宅g-
t旬ermpolitiたcalr陀elationswith coun凶ltne出swho are not candidates for accession s乱叩ucha剖sUkr百aine.'刊')
114 See As鉛socαla低叩ti白onAgreem児en凶ltBetween the European Union and i 臼 Member States， of the One Part， 
and Ukraine， of the Other Part， Mar. 21， 2014， 2014 O.J. (L 161) 3 [hereinafter EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States， of the One Part， and Georgia， of the Other Part， June 27， 2014， 2014 
O.J. (L 261) 4 [hereinafter EU-Georgia Association Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States， of the One Part， 
and the Republic of Moldova， of the Other Part， June 27， 2014， 2014 0.1 (L 260) 4 [hereinafter EU-
Moldova Association Agreement]. 
115 Association Agreements， supra note 113. 
116 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European U nion art. 217， June 7， 
2016，20160.1. (C 202) 13. 
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generally characterized by a number of principles， including “a clause on the 
respect of human rights and democratic principles."117 
These Association Agreements are relevant in that they have labor 
standards and dispute settlement mechanisms consistent with E U  FTAs. For 
example， the EU  -Ukraine A A  states the parties shall promote the ILO core 
labor standards， and implement ratified ILO conventions， shall not use labor 
laws for protectionist purposes， or lower labor standards for trade advantage， 
and shall enforce the labor laws.
118 
The dispute settlement provisions are 
like those of the E U  FTAs in that they provide for consultation and use of a 
panel of experts. 119 
2. BITs 
Currently， the European Union does not have a BIT with China， 120 
though some E U  members do (with labor provisions). It now appears the 
European Union itself will have the lead in negotiating external BITs.
121 It 
also appears the European Union is moving toward including “better 
practices" 122 into its BITs， which arguably can include labor rights. 123 Since 
117 Association Agreements， supra note 113. 
118 See EU -Ukraine Association Agreement， supra note 114， art. 291 (2-4). 
119 See id. art. 300(7). See also EU-Georgia Association Agreement， supra note 114，但t.378(1); EU-
Mo1dova Association Agreement， supra note 114， art. 242(1). 
120 The EU-China Investement Treaty， FED'N OF GERMAN INDUS. (BDI) (Mar. 21，2019)， 
https://english.bdi.eu!artic1e/news/the-eu-china-investment-treaty/. 
121 See Peter Turner & Christian Nitsch， Freshfie1ds Bruckhaus Deringer LLP， EU Reveals the Future 
01 BITs Between European States and the Rest 01 the World， LEXOLOGY (Jan. 10， 2013)， 
https://www.1exo1ogy.c01u!library/detai1.aspx?g=dac2e673-ce20-48cO-a589-2dd934ca190b “When the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009，出eEuropean Union (EU) was granted exc1usive 
competence over its member states for dealing with ‘foreign direct investment'. This competence， part of 
由eEU's common commercia1 policy， extended to bi1atera1 investment treaties conc1uded between EU 
member states and third countries (Extra-EU BITs). At the time， there were a1ready over 1，000 Extra-EU 
BITs in existence， whose future status required c1arification. On 9 January 2013， a new European 
regu1ation dealing with the status of Extra-EU BITs comes into force-Regu1ation (EU) No 1219/2012 of 
由eEuropean Parliament and of the Counci1 of 12 December 2012 establishing transitiona1 arrangements 
for bi1atera1 investment agreements between Member states and third countriesー (theRegu1ation ). . . . The 
default position is that Extra-EU BITs signed prior to December 2009 wi1 remain in force unti1 they are 
rep1aced by new treaties between the EU itse1f and the re1evant third countries (the EU BITs). Extra-EU 
BITs signed after December 2009 will need to be reviewed by the Commission in order to ensure their 
compliance with EU 1aw.") 
122 See Catharine Titi， International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New 
Generation 01 International Investment Agreements， 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 639， 641 (2015) (“We are 
witnessing由edec1ine of the old EU member state ‘good practices' and the dawning of a new era， that of 
由eEU's 'better practices."'). The EU is moving from member-state-cen町icBITs to an inc1usive EU-wide 
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2016， the European Union and China have indicated that their BIT “will also 
include rules on environmental and labor-related dimensions of foreign 
mvestment." 124 
a. EU BITs with Labor Standards 
Three EU members have entered into four BITs that include labor 
provisions， including Austria， which has entered into three separate BITs. 
i) Austria-Tajikistan 2010 BIT 
The 2010 Austria-Tajikistan BIT's Article 5， Investment and Labor， 
includes the following provisions: 
1. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage an investment by weakening domestic labor laws. 
2. For the purposes of this Article，“labor laws" means each 
Contracting Party's statutes or regulations， that are directly 
related to the following intemationally recognized labor rights: 
a. the right of association; 
b. the right to organize and to bargain collectively; 
template for BITs that will create a uniform approach to investment protection. EU members states' 
“established BIT practice is referred to as their‘best practices.' Member state bilateral investment treaties， 
which are liberal instruments strongly protective of investor interests， have remained relatively unchanged 
over the years， in contrast with their North American counterparts， which have come to represent a new 
type of investment町eaty，cognizant for the first time of the contracting parties' right to regulate. With the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the exercise of the EU's new competence over the conclusion 
of treaties covering foreign direct investment， Europe marks its distances with the old approach of the 
member states and appears eager to set its own 'model'. While broadly in harmony with the new generation 
of North American investment treaties， the new EU policy aims to improve international investment law in 
innovative ways， targeting both substantive and procedural protections， and leading to a yet newer 
generation of international investment treaties." Id. at 639 
123 See id. at 643. (“[T]he EU Minimum Platform on Investment served as a basis for the negotiation 
of a number of FTAs， such as the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and 
the 2010 EU-South Korea FTA. Indeed， these町eatiescontain provisions on the non-lowering of 
environmental， safety， and labour standards， [and] references to the fight against co町uptionand the 
International Labour Organization . . ."). 
124 EU and China Agree on Scope 01 the Future Investment Deal， EUROPEAN COMM'N (Jan. 15， 
2016)， http://trade.ec.europa.eu!doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435 (In January 2016， the EU Commission 
reported:“Meeting this week in Beijing， the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an 
ambitious and comprehensive scope of the upcoming EU-China investment agreement and moved into a 
phase of specific text-based negotiations."). 
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c. a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labor; 
d. labor protections for children and young people， 
including a minimum age for the employment of children 
and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
child labor; 
e. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages， hours of work， and occupational safety and 
health. 
f. elimination of discrimination in employment and 
occupation.
125 
The labor proVlslons in the Austria-Nigeria 2013 BIT126 and the 
Austria-Kyrgyz 2016 BIT127 are identical with that in the above Tajikistan 
BIT. 
i) Belgium-Luxembourg-Montenegro 2010 BIT 
Belgium and Luxembourg， both EU  Members， together entered into a 
BIT agreement with Montenegro，128 which also included a labor provision. 
Under Article 1(6)， the agreement defined key terms: 
[t]he terms “labor legislation" shall mean legislation of the 
Kingdom of Belgium， of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg or 
125 See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REPUBLIK OSTERREICH UND DER REPUBLIK TADSCHIKISTAN UBER 
DIE Fd艮DERUNGUND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE REpUBLIC OF AUSTRIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN] 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT II [BGBL II] No. 18/2012， https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgb1IIIII2012/18/20120125 
(Austria). 
126 See Nationa1rat [NR] [Nationa1 Counci1] Gesetzgebungsperiode [GP] 24 Bei1age [B1g] No. 2301， 
https://www.par1ament.gv.at!P AKTIVHG/XXIV II/C02301/index.shtm1 (Austria) (Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and the Federa1 Republic of 
Nigeria). 
127 See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REGIERUNG DER REpUBLIK OSTERREICH UND DER REGIERUNG DER 
KIRGISISCHEN REpUBLIK UBER DIE FORDERUNG UND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR 
THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REpUBLIC OF 
AUSTRIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KYRGYZ REpUBLIC] BUNDESGESETZBLATT II [BGBL II] No. 
120/201 7， ht甲s://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgb1IIIII2017/120/20170727(Au呂町ia).
128 See Agreement between由eBe1gium-Luxembourg Economic Union， on the One Hand， and 
Montenegro， on the Other Hand， on the Reciproca1 Promotion and Protection of Investment， Be1g.-Lux.-
Montenegro， Feb. 16， 2010， Inv. Policy Hub， ht甲s://investmen甲olicy.unctad.org/internationa1-in ves tment-
agreements/treaty -fi1es/3 89/ down1oad. 
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of Montenegro， or provisions thereof， that are directly re1ated to 
the following intemationally recognized 1abor rights: a) the 
right of association; b) the right to organize and bargain 
collective1y; c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compu1sory 1abor; d) a minimum age for the emp10yment of 
chi1dren; e) acceptab1e conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages， hours of work， and occupationa1 safety and 
health.129 
And， the following provisions under Article 6: 
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to estab1ish 
its own domestic 1abor standards， and to adopt or modify 
according1y its 1abor 1egis1ation， each Contracting Party 
shall strive to ensure that its 1egis1ation provide for 1abor 
standards consistent with the intemationally recognized 
1abor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article 1 and shall 
strive to improve those 1abor standards in that 1ight. 
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by re1axing domestic 1abor 1egis1ation. 
According1y， each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure 
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from， or offer to 
waive or derogate from， such 1egis1ation as an 
encouragement for the estab1ishment， maintenance or 
expansion in its territory of an investment. 
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their ob1igations as 
members of the Internationa1 Labor Organization and their 
commitments under the Intemationa1 Labor Organization 
Declaration on Fundamenta1 Princip1es and Rights at Work 
and its Follow-up. The Contracting Parties shall strive to 
ensure that such 1abor princip1es and the intemationally 
recognized 1abor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article 1 
are recognized and protected by domestic 1egis1ation. 
4. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between 
them provides enhanced opportunities to improve 1abor 
standards. Upon request by either Contracting Party， the 
other Contracting Party shall accept to ho1d expert 
129Id. art. 1(6). 
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consultations on any matter falling under the purpose of this 
Article.130 
Interestingly， besides the recent promotion of “best practices" by the 
European Union， and the inclusion of labor provisions in the four BITs by 
Austria and Belgium-Luxembourg， itseems only the U.S. has heretofore 
included labor provlslons in its BITs; 131 and in that regard， the U.S. 
continues negotiations for a BIT with China that include some labor 
proVlslons which cal for tougher standards.132 It appears the European 
Union and China in their new BIT will join the U.S.， albeit with only 
consultation as its means of enforceability and not with possible sanctions as 
allowed by U.S. labor provisions. 
130ld. art. 6. 
131 See Schott & Cimino， supra note 69， at 8. Before 2005， there was no U.S. BIT with labor 
provisions， except for those with Uruguay and Rwanda. See Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning由eEncouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment， U.S.-Uru.， Nov. 4， 2005， T.I.A.S. 06-110 1; Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection ofInvestment， U.S.-Rwanda， Feb. 19，2008， T.I.A.S. 12-101 
132 See Ronald C. Brown， lnternational lnfluences and Obligations Arising from Bilateral lnvestment 
Treaties (BITS) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and ILO Standards， in FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR 
RIGHTS IN CHINA-LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CULTURAL LOGIC 169， 174-78何laLiukkunen & 
Yifeng Chen eds.， 2016). The Obama administration issued a revised U.S. model BIT in e但・ly2012. See 
U.s. DEP'T OF STATE & OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.， 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY (2012)， https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/l88371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL 
BIT]. These revisions will undoubtedly complicate ongoing discussions between the United States and 
China and other emerging markets. The major・changesof the latest revision include: strong町ansparency
obligations on regulations and other matters affecting investment and commitments to increase stakeholder 
and public participation; expanded labor and environmental standards with commitments not to “waive or 
derogate" from domestic labor and environmental laws， to“effectively enforce" such laws， and to 
recognize international commitments under the International Labor Organization and other multilateral 
agreements; and clarified specifications for state-owned enterprises “SOEs") and commitments not to 
impose technology transfer requirements and to encourage investor participation in the development of 
standards and regulations. See also Titi， supra note 104， at643. 
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3. Free Trade Agreements 
a. Background 
The evolution of labor provisions in FTAs by the European Union has 
transformed in recent years and their usefulness continues to grow， as 
discussed below.13 
FTAs are the most economically significant aspect of EU trade 
policy. They could cover as much as two thirds of EU trade if 
al current negotiations are successfully concluded. They are 
also the most important legally binding instruments that the EU 
can use in its extemal policy. Labor provisions within EU FTAs 
have “widened and deepened" over the past decade. This is 
linked in part to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which accorded greater 
influence in trade policy-making to the European Parliament; an 
institution which has emphasized the labor and human rights 
dimensions of trade policy.134 
A significant point of departure for labor provisions in 
EU FTAs was the 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). Unlike its predecessors， this agreement 
contained more references to social policy norms and core labor 
standards. It also allowed for disputes on social issues to be 
referred to independent experts， and institutionalized dialogue 
about the trade agreement within a civil society mechanism 
(CSM). Since the negotiation of the 2011 EU-Korea FTA such 
provisions have been packaged . . . in a Trade and Sustainable 
Development (TSD) chapter. TSD chapters have become an 
integral part of the EU's 'new generation' trade agreements. 
Such chapters were present in finalized agreements with a 
further 18 countries as of July 2017， with bold claims made 
about their efficacy. TSD chapters are meant to ensure that 
economic growth goes hand in hand with higher labor 
133 See generally Lina Lorenzoni Escobar， Sustaintable Development and International Investment: A 
Legal Analysis of the EU's Policy from FTAs to CETA， 136 BEITRAGE ZUM TRANSATIONALEN 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2015) 
134 Harrison et a1.， supra note 4， at260 
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standards， making trade policy “not just about interests but also 
about values."135 
The TSD chapters in EU FTAs have a tripartite format. First， there are 
substantive standards committing to ILO core labor standards and the 
Decent Work Agenda; second， there are obligations and procedural 
commitments relating to implementation; and third， there are institutional 
mechanisms to resolve disputes. 
All agreements since the EU-Korea FTA have a tripartite 
format. Committees of state/EU officials from the two parties 
are established to oversee the implementation of the TSD 
chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a 
Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) including representatives of 
businessラ trade unionsラ non-govemmental organizations 
(NGOs) and occasionally academia， with the DAGs of the two 
parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally， there is an 
expert panel that investigates complaints made by the parties 
and makes recommendations on them. The implication of the 
agreement text is that these institutions will interact to 
effectively implement the TSD chapter.136 
b. Japan， CETA， and South Korea 
For purposes of comparison， the European Union's recent FTAs with 
J apan， Canada， and South Korea are discussed below. 
i) EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA) 
On July 17， 2018， the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
(“EPA"， also called FTA) was signed by the parties.137 
Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the agreement “shows 
the world the unshaken political will of Japan and the European Union to 
lead the world as the champions of free trade at a time when protectionism 
135 Id. at 261. 
136 Id. 
137 See Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership， July 17， 
2018，20180.1. (L 330) 3 [hereinafter EU-Japan EPA]. 
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has spread."138 The trade agreement is the biggest ever negotiated by the 
European Union and will create an open trade zone covering over 600 
million people. President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
stated: 
The document we signed today is much more than a trade 
agreement. It is of course a tool that will create opportunities 
for our companies， our workers and our citizens and that will 
boost the European and Japanese economies. But it is also a 
statement. For its content， its scope and also its timing. It is a 
statement by two likeminded partners that together represent 
nearly a third of the world's GDP and reiterate their 
commitment to uphold the highest standards in areas such as 
labor， safety， environmental or consumer protection. 139 
The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 16 are 
highlighted below in summary form.140 
l. Source of labor standards: 
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow-up of 1998141 
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of 
2008142 
2.0bligations: 
a. the four core labor rights 143 
138 Hiroshi Hiyama， EU， Japan Sign Major Trade Deal in “Message Against Protectionism"， 
YAHOO! NEWS (July 17， 2018)， ht甲s:/sg.news.yaho.com!eu寸apan-sign-masive-trade-deal-us-puts-
06252343-finance.html (Abe continued， saying that“Japan and the EU wil form a united front against a 
US threat to impose tarifs on key products such as cars.") 
139 EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement， EUROPEAN COMM'N (July 16， 2018)， 
htps:/europa.eu/rapid/pres-release_IP-18-4526_en.htm 
140 See EU -Japan EP A， supra note 17. A year earlier a summ但'ydocument was sent to Member 
States and the European Parliament for information and which labor provisions miror the 2018 final 
agreement. See also EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement， supra note 19. 
141 See EU-Japan EPA， supra note 17， art. 16.1. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. art. 16.3(2). 
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b. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards 
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the 
other Conventions each Party considers appropriate.144 
c. shall not encourage trade or investment by relaxing or 
lowering the level of protection provided by their 
respective environmental or labor laws and regulations. 
To that effect， the Parties shall not waive or otherwise 
derogate from those laws and regulations or fail to 
effectively enforce them through a sustained or recurring 
course of action or inaction 145 
d. effectively implement its law and practices 146 
e. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law147 
3. Labor Dispute Resolution 
a. Disputes for labor violations: “In the event of 
disagreement between the Parties on any matter 
regarding the interpretation or application of this Chapter， 
the Parties shall only have recourse to the procedures set 
out in this Article and Article 16.18. The provisions of 
this Chapter shall not be subject to dispute settlement 
under Chapter 2l."148 
b. Filing partv:“Parties" 149 
c. Procedure~: Joint dialogue between civil societies， 
govemment consult， then mediation by panel of 
experts150 
d. Decision-Maker: Panel of Experts: “Each Party is 
responsible for ensuring a balanced representation of 
independent economic， social and environmental 
stakeholders， including employers' and workers' 
144 Id. art. 16.3(3). 
145 Id. art. 16.2(3). 
146 Id. art. 16.3(5) 
147 Id. art. 16.3(6) 
148 Id. art. 16.17(1). 
149 Id. art. 16.3(1) 
150 Id. arts. 16.16， 16.17， & 16.18 
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organizations and environmental groups， in the advisory 
group or groups." 151 
e. Upon determination of violation:“A Party may request in 
writing consultations with the other Party on any matter 
conceming the interpretation and application of this 
Chapter. The Party requesting consultations shall set out 
the reasons for the request， including identification of the 
matter and an indication of its factual and legal basis， 
specifying the relevant provisions of this Chapter."152 
f. Decision made public:“The Parties shall ensure that the 
solutions reached through the consultations under this 
Article will be jointly made publicly available， unless the 
Parties agree otherwise."153 
g. Sanction~: No penalty， only persuasion， not coercion. 
“The Parties shall discuss actions or measures to resolve 
the matter in question， taking into account the panel's 
final report and its suggestions. Each Party shall inform 
the other Party and its own domestic advisory group or 
groups of any follow-up actions or measures no later than 
three months after the date of issuance of the final report. 
The follow-up actions or measures shall be monitored by 
the Committee. The domestic advisory group or groups 
and the Joint Dialogue may submit their observations in 
this regard to the Committee." 154 
i) Canada-EU and its Member States (“CETA ")155 
The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 23 are 
highlighted below in summary form.156 
1. Source of Labor Standards: 
151 Id. 16.15 (2). 
152 Id. 16.17(2). 
153 Id. art. 16.18. 
154 Id. art. 16.18(6). 
155 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada， of the One Part， and由e
European Union and its Member States， of the Other Part， Oct. 30， 2016， 2017 0.1 (L 1) 23 [hereinafter 
CETA] 
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a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow-up of 1998157 
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of 
2008158 
2. Obligations: 
a. To legally protect the four core labor rights 159 
b. To promote the objectives of the ILO Decent Work 
Agenda in accordance with the 2008 ILO Declaration on 
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization: 160 (a) health and 
safety at work， including the prevention of occupational 
injury or illness and compensation in cases of such injury 
or illness; (b) establishment of acceptable mlmmum 
employment standards for wage eamers， including those 
not covered by a collective agreement; and， (c) non-
discrimination in respect of working conditions， 
including for migrant workers. 161 
c. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards 
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the 
other Conventions that are classified as “up-to-date" by 
the IL0162 
d. Effectively implement its laws and practices163 
e. Not encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law164 
3. Labor Dispute Resolution: 
a. Disputes for labor violations:“For any dispute that arises 
under this Chapter， the Parties shall only have recourse to 
the rules and procedures provided in this Chapter.川 65
b. Filing partv: “Parties means， on the one hand， the 
European Union or its Member States or the European 
157 Id. art. 23.3(1). 
158 Id. art. 23.3(2). 
159 Id. art. 23.3(1)(a)一(d).
160 Id. art. 23.3(2). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. art. 23.3(4) 
163 Id. art. 23.4(1)-(2). 
164 Id. art. 23.4(2)-(3). 
165 Id. art. 23.11(1). 
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Union and its Member States within their respective 
areas of competence as derived from the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU 
Party')， and on the other hand， Canada."166 
c. Procedure~: Consultation between governments， then 
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the 
FTA procedures] 167 
d. Decision-Maker: the terms of reference of the Panel of 
Experts are as follows: "to examine， in the light of the 
relevant provisions of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and 
Labour)， the matter referred to in the request for the 
establishment of the Panel of Experts， and to deliver a 
report， in accordance with Article 23.10 (Panel of 
Experts) of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and Labour)， 
that makes recommendations for the resolution of the 
matter.川 68Each Party shall convene a new or consult its 
domestic labor or sustainable development advisory 
groups， toseek views and advice on issues relating to this 
Chapter. Those groups shall comprise independent 
representative organizations of civil society in a balanced 
representation of employers， unions， labor and business 
organizations， as well as other relevant stakeholders as 
appropriate. They may submit opmlOns and make 
recommendations on any matter related to this Chapter 
on their own initiative.169 
e. Upon determination of violatiog: If the final report of the 
Panel of Experts determines that a Party has not 
conformed with its obligations under this Chapter， the 
Parties shall engage in discussions and shall endeavor， 
within three months of the delivery of the final陀 port，to 
identify appropriate measures or， ifappropriate， to decide 
upon a mutually satisfactory action plan. 170 
167 Id. arts. 23.9 & 23.10. 
168 Id. art. 23.10 (8). 
169 Id. art. 23.8 (4) 
170 Id. art. 23.10 (12) 
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f. Decision made publif: Each Party shall make the final 
report publicly available within 30 days of its delivery.171 
g. Sanctione.: No penalty， only persuasion， not coercion172 
ii) The EU FTA with South Korea173 
The EU-South Korea FTA has been provisionally applied since July 
2011 and was formally ratified in December 2015.174 Chapter thirteen 
contains the labor standard provisions， highlighted below in summary form. 
l. Source of Labor Standards: 
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and its Follow-up of 1998175 
b. 2006 Ministerial Declaration of the UN Economic and 
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work176 
2.0bligations: 
a. to protect the four core labor rights ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-up of 199817 
b. to promote the objectives ILO Decent Work Agenda in 
accordance with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice 
for a Fair Globalization of 2008178 
171 Id. art. 23.10 (11). 
172 Id. art. 23.11. See also id. arts. 1.， 23.1-23.4， 23.8-23.10， & 8.1 (Treatment of Investors and 
Covered Investments). In contrast to CETA's binding investment court system designed to protect foreign 
mvestors，出e1abor chapter's compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding process of cooperation， dia10g 
and recommendations to address 1abor rights vio1ations. See Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement (CETA人 EUROPEAN COMM'N (Feb. 26， 2019)， 
ht甲://trade.ec.europa.eu!doc1ib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf
173 Countries and Regions: South Korea， EUROPEAN COMM'N (May 7， 2019)， 
ht甲://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea!.For an assessment of that 
agreement， see generally Giovanni Gruni， Labor Standards in the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Pushing Labor Standards into Global Trade Law人5KOREAN J. INT'L COMP. L. 100， 100-19 (2017). 
174 Countries and Regions:・SouthKorea， supra note Error! Bookmark oot defioed.. See Free Trade 
Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States， of the One Part， and the Republic of 
Korea， of the Other Part， Sep. 16，2010，2011 0.1. (L 127) 6 [hereinafter EU-South Korea FTA] 
175 EU-South Korea FTA， supra note 174， at但t.13.4(3) 
176 Id. art. 13.4(2) 
177 Id. art. 13.4(3) 
178 Id. art. 13.4(2) 
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c. to ensure that its labor law and practices embody and 
provide protection for the above [core labor] 
obligations 179 
d. to recognize and promote the 2006 Ministerial 
Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on 
Full Employment and Decent Work180 
e. parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards 
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the 
other Conventions that are classified as ‘up-to-date' by 
the IL0181 
f. effectively implement its law and practices 182 
g. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law183 
3. Labor Dispute Resolution: 
a. Disputes for labor violations:“For any matter ansmg 
under this Chapter， the Parties shall only have recourse to 
the procedures provided for in Articles 13.14 and 
13.15"184 
b. Filing Party:“Parties" 185 
c. Procedure~: Consultation between govemments， then 
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the 
FTA procedures 186 
d. Decision-maker: 
C∞omp戸n臼se引(s吟)independent representati ve organizations of 
civil society in a balanced representation of environment， 
labor and business organizations as well as other relevant 
stakeholders." 187 
e. Panel of Experts:“The experts shall be independent of， 
and not be affiliated with or take instructions from， either 
179 Id. art. 13.4(3). 
180 Id. art. 13.4(2) 
181 Id. art. 13.4(3). 
182 Id. art. 13.7(1). 
183 Id. art. 13.7(2). 
184 Id. art. 13.16 
185 Id. art. 13.2(1) 
186 Id. arts. 13.4 & 13.5 
187 Id. art. 13.12(5). 
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Party or organizations represented in the Domestic 
Advisory Group(s)."188 
f. Upon Determination of Violation:“If a Party considers 
that the matter needs further discussion， that Party may 
request that the Committee on Trade and Sustainable 
Development be convened to consider the matter by 
delivering a written request to the contact point of the 
other Party." 189 
g. Decision Made Publif: the report of the Panel of Experts 
shall be made available to the Domestic Advisory 
Group(s) of the Parties.190 
h. Sanction~: No penalty， only persuasion， not coercion. 
“Recognizing the importance of cooperating on trade-
related aspects of social and environmental policies in 
order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement."191 
4. International Standards 
a. ILO 
As a member of the ILO， China has ratified four of the eight core 
labor conventions， 192while al EU Members have ratified al eight core labor 
conventions.193 A distinction can be made between an FTA commitment to 
honor the ILO Declaration， which incorporates al the conventions 194 and 
honors specific convention (but is interpreted as providing only general 
obligations)， with a non-FTA commitment. Commitments to specific 
conventions are interpreted as forming more precise obligations. 
188 Id. art. 13.15(3). 
189 Id. art. 13.14(3). 
190 Id. art. 13.15(2). 
191 Id. art. 13.1 
192 See Ratifications for China， ILO， ht甲s://www.i1o.org/dynJnorm1ex/enJf?p=100:120:0:
NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Dec. 1，2019). 
193 See INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION， INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CORE LABOUR 
STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (201)， ht甲s://www.ituc-
csi.orgIIMG/pdf/FinaLdrafCICLS_in_the_European_ U nion_ -_6_and_8_Ju1y-20 1 L2_.pdf. See also 
Ratげ7cationsby Convention， supra note 192; ILO， THE ILO AND THE EU， PARTNERS FOR DECENT WORK 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8 (2012)， htps:/ww.i1o.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--europe/--ro-geneva/ーi1o-
bruse1s/documents/publication/wcms_195135.pdf. 
194 Brown， China-U.S. Implementation of ILO Standards by BITs and Pieces (FTAs)， supra note 12， 
at 171-73. 
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b. OECD 
The OECD consists of thirty-six member countries 195 and assists these 
countries to foster prosperity and fight poverty through data collection， 
review， standards setting， and agreements for cooperation， ranging from 
agriculture to taxation.
196 
China was invited by the OECD in 2007 as a “Key 
Partner" (not a Member) to strengthen cooperation through OECD 
"Enhanced Engagement" programs.
197 
As an active Key Partner， China 
participates in eleven significant OECD bodies and projects. Likewise， the 
European Union， as an organization (not a state)， is not a Member; nor does 
it have the right to vote or officially take part in the adoption of legal 
instruments submitted to the Council for adoption. Nonetheless，“its 
participation goes well beyond that of an observer."198 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“MNCs")199 were 
issued to guide govemmental and business conduct through implementing 
195 See Member Countries， supra note Error! Bookmark oot defioed. (member countries include 
Australia， Austria， Belgium， Canada， Chile， Czech Republic， Denmark， Estonia， Finland， France， Germany， 
Greece， Hungary， Iceland， lreland， Israel， Italy， Japan， Korea， Latvia， Luxembourg， Mexico， the 
Netherlands， New Zealand， Norway， Poland， Portugal， Slovak Republic， Slovenia， Spain， Sweden. 
Switzerland， Turkey， the United Kingdom， and the United States) 
196 Bill Witherell， Director for Financial， Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs， OECD， Remarks at the CFO 
Strategies: Corporate Accountability Forum (May 17， 2004)， 
http://www .oecd.org/corporate/ca!corporategovernanceprinciples/3203404 7 .pdf (“Reflecting the great 
heterogeneity in both OECD and non-OECD countries， the new Principles retain their non-binding， 
principles-based approach， which recognizes the need to adapt implementation to varying legal， economic 
and cultural circumstances."). See generally Organisational Structure， OECD， 
http://www.oecd.org/about!structure/ (last visited Dec. 1， 2019). The OECD uses information on various 
topics to fight poverty， help governments prosper， and prevent financial instability. The organization 
monitors the economies of member and non-member nations， and the Secretariat collects and analyzes 
information on different aspects of society. See general⑮ What is the OECD人 CORP.FIN. INST.， 
https:/ /corporatetinanceinstitute.com!resources/knowledge/economics/oecd/ (last visited Nov. 27， 2019). 
197 See People's Republic 01 China， ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.， 
http://www.oecd.org/china/ (last visited Dec. 1，2019). 
198 European Union and the OECD， OECD， https://www.oecd.org/eu/european-union-and-oecd.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27， 2019). 
199 See generally OECD， OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011). Beginning 
in 1976， the OECD developed working relationships with the ILO， the International Organization for 
Standardization， the World Bank， the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights， the UN Global 
Compact， UN Finance Initiative， the Global Reporting Initiative， and由eInternational Coordinating 
Committee of Human Rights Institutions. See OECD， 2013 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1 (2013) 
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procedures.“National Contact Points"200 hold Member states and MNCs， 
and their contractors，201 responsible to meet certain labor standards for their 
workers. Under OECD standards， Article V Employment and lndustrial 
Relations states workers should have labor rights that mirror the ILO's core 
labor rights， which also require enterprises to use "due diligence"202 in 
effectuating those rightS.203 While there are numbers of successful resolution 
of labor disputes through the OECD consultation， mediation， investigation， 
and recommendation procedures， the Guidelines remain voluntary. Under 
the Guidelines， enterprises should carry out due diligence to identify， prevent 
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts on human rights， industrial 
issues including labor standards， etc. Enterprises should also carry out "due 
diligence" in relation to their suppliers and other business relations， to seek 
to prevent or mitigate adverse impact that is directly linked to their 
operations， products or services. However， due diligence without 
consequences for failure seem ill-considered and some countries， such as 
France， have instituted legislative consequences.204 
C. WBO 
The World Bank's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) 
launched on October 1， 2018 and provides detailed labor and working 
condition requirements for loan recipients， including grievance 
mechanisms.205 The 2018 Framework， which will gradually replace the 
200 See National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises， OECD， 
htp:/ww.oecd.org/investment!mne/ncps.htm (last visited Dec. 1，2019). 
201 See generally OECD， OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES， supra note 19， at 
35 (Chapter V. Emp10yment and Industria1 Re1ations). See also general⑮ Rona1d C. Brown， OECD 
National Contact Point， Denmark: Specific Instance Notified by Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark and 
Active Consumers Regarding the Activities of the PWT Group， Final Statement， 17 October 2016， 3INT'L 
LABOR RIGHTS CASE L. 23 (2017) 
加 OECD，OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSilLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 15-19 (2018)， 
ht甲:/mneguidelines .oecd. org/O ECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for -Responsib1e-B usines -Conduct. pdf 
(outlining practica1 aplication and discusing due diligence obligation). 
203 See OECD， OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES， supra note 19， at 35-37 
204 See Rona1d C. Brown， Due Diligence“Hard Law" Remedies for MNC Labor Chain Workers， 22 
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AF. 19， 120， 154 (2018) 
205 THE WORLD BANK， THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 31-36 (2017)， 
htp:/pubdocs. wor1dbank.org/en!83 77215227620501 08Anvironmenta1-and-Socia1-Framework.pdf 
(“Where nationa1 1aw restricts workers' organizations， the project wi1 not restrict project workers from 
deve10ping alternative mechanisms to expres their grievances and protect their rights regarding working 
conditions and terms of emp1oyment. The Borrower shou1d not sek to influence or contro1 these 
alternative mechanisms."). 
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Safeguard po1icies， provides improved protections for the most vu1nerab1e 
peop1e， and for the environment. 
These requirements are app1icab1e to China in that as of June 30， 
2018， the bank's cumu1ative 1ending to China was near1y $62 billion for 
more than 400 projects.206 The portfo1io is concentrated in environment， 
transportation， urban deve1opment， rura1 deve1opment， energy， water 
resources management， and human deve1opment. 207 The detai1ed 1abor and 
working condition requirements cover:208 
1. Working conditions and management of worker 
re1ationships 
a. Terms and conditions of emp10yment 
b. Nondiscrimination and equa1 opportunity 
c. Worker's organizations 
2. Protecting the workp1ace 
a. Chi1d 1abor and minimum wage 
b. Forced 1abor 
3. Grievance mechanism 209 
4. Occupationa1 Health and Safety (“OHS") 
5. Contracted workers 
6. Community workers 
7. Primary supp1y workers21O 
206 Emel Akan， World Bank Will Cut Loans to China， Bank's New President Says， THE EpOCH TIMES 
(Apr. 11， 2019)， https://www.theepochtimes.comJworld-bank-will-cut-loans-to-china-says-banks-new-
presidenc2875974.html. 
207 See Projects & Programs: China， THE WORLD BANK， https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/projects-list?searchTerm=china [https://perma.cc/NZE9-6VUC] (last visited Dec. 1， 2019) (the 
first twenty projects listed are those in China) 
208 See THE WORLD BANK， THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK， supra 
note 205， at 32-36 (Labor and Working Conditions). Some 但・econcerned about the efficacy of 
enforcement of these standards. 
209 See THE WORLD BANK， THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK， supra 
note 205， at34 
210 See THE WORLD BANK， THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK， supra 
note 205， at 31-36. See also THE WORLD BANK， ESS2: LABOUR AND WORKING CONDITIONS， 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/enlI49761530216793411ASF-GN2-June-2018.pdf. Public comment by the 
International Trade Union ConfederationlGlobal Unions regarding the draft Guidance Note for ESS2: 
Labour and W orking Conditions was made in December 2017， and suggested modifications were offered. 
These included， for example， adding confidentiality and anti-retaliation provisions to the grievance 
procedures. ITUC， PUBLIC COMMENT DECEMBER 2017 BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION 
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The enforcement process over prior years seems to have been to 
improve labor systems as opposed to redressing individuals' grievances; it is 
not yet clear whether the 2018 procedures will be different.21 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 刀mefor仰 EU-ChinaBIT and FTA with Labor Provisions ? 
The current opportunities and timing for growth and mutual benefit 
flowing to the European Union and China-and their workers-from a BIT 
and an FTA may have never been better geopolitically and economically. 
Developments， described above， suggest it is time to move forward and 
accelerate the commercial traffic along a key corridor of China's Old Silk 
Road and better hamess the EU -China billion dollar per day trade and its 
expanding FDI. The apparent obstacles of China's trade practices and 
European Union's diverse political makeup can be seen as challenges to 
overcome. Beginning with completion of the EU-China BIT or its absorption 
into an EU-China FTA， the parties with renewed efforts can reach 
accommodations on an FTA. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that 
the inclusion of labor protection provisions will not be an obstacle as the 
parties reportedly are now drafting it in their new BIT; and， their current 
labor provisions do not significantly difer. This result is also supported by a 
number of intemationallabor obligations emanating from the ILO， OECD， 
WBO， and prior FTAs. 
Already， China is engaged in TiSA and OECD discussions dealing 
with faimess and transparency in trade. Both the European Union and China 
CONFEDERATION/GLOBAL UNIONS REGARDING THE DRAFT GUIDANCE NOTE FOR ES2: LABOUR AND 
WORKING CONDITIONS 9， htp:/pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/338031515447125004IESFGuidanceNote 
CommentsonESS 1ESS2ESS 1 ObyITUCandG1obaIUnionspartnerorganizationsDec 1520 17 .pdf. 
211 There is no reported consensus yet on the efect of the new Guidance. See World Bank Leaves 
Door Open to Slaveη in Paraguay， ITUC (Aug. 1，2018)， htps:/ww.ituc-csi.org/world-bank-1eaves-
dor-open-to (“Questions have arisen regarding WBO enforcement. The World Bank's private 1ending arm 
c1aimed由atits investment in Minerva wou1d he1p improve conditions in the Chaco. However， five ye但.s
1ater the prob1ems of modern slavery and environmenta1 destruction persist， and litt1e progres has ben 
made on sup1y chain responsibility. As p但tof the investment package， Minerva agred to an 
“Environmenta1 and Socia1 Action P1an". Among other actions， it inc1uded the undertaking of a “sup1y 
chain verification system" as wel as of a mapping exercise to identify those regions and supliers more 
like1y to alow chi1d and forced 1abor. However， the company mised the deadline to met these 
commitments. Today， it is unc1ear whether the IFC is ho1ding Minerva acountab1e and ensuring the 
imp1ementation of the measures necesary to prevent forced and chi1d 1abor in the bef sup1y chain."). 
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have had for some years， high-Ievel committees working on the issues of the 
FTA. Many new regional FTAs (such as CPTTP， RCEP， and TTIP) are 
raising the issue of who will write the rules of commerce for the future 
years. While differences in domestic labor standards can be described，212 it is 
argued that labor provisions in an FTA or BIT can enhance and elevate labor 
protections. At the same time， they will not thwart accommodation and 
agreement on an EU-China FTA or BIT， as for better or worse， from past 
practice， these treaties are general obligations with only dialogue and 
cooperation used for their enforcement. Additionally， some of the EU 
Members' labor practices and standards are quite like those in parts of 
China， both positively and negatively. Other more controversial areas of 
trade could be accommodated by a gradual phase-in， such as in the recent 
EU-Japan FTA where some provisions are phased in over 15 years.213 
Comparing past BITs of China and the European Union， respectively， 
neither includes labor provisions. However， three EU Members， Austria and 
Belgium-Luxembourg (in tandem)， have concluded BITs containing labor 
provisions that are quite like those in the recent EU FTAs and China's FTA-
related MOUs regarding labor standards and dispute resolution. Currently， 
the European Union is moving toward a new protocol for BITs that include 
“best practices，" though it is not labor specific.214 Recently in CETA， the 
European Union has included investment provisions in the FTA itself.215 
212 See generally CA1HERINE BARNARD， EU EMPLOYMENT LAW (4th ed. 2012) (for information 
regarding the EU). 
213 EUROPEAN COMM'N， EU-JAPAN EPA - THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (2017)， 
http://町ade.ec.europa.eu!doclib/docs/2017 /july/町adoc_155693.doc.pdf(stating tariffs of up to 28.9% will 
be eliminated over fifteen years). See also Jim Brunsden & Valentina Romei， Why the EU's Agreement 
with Japan Is A Big Deal， FIN. TIMES (July 6， 2017)， https://www.ft.com!content!572fef42-6260-11e7-
91a7-502打ee26895
214 See Titi， supra note 104， at 41 (discussing how the European Commission urged that the EU 
should follow the available “best practices" to ensure由atno EU investor would be worse off than they 
would be under Member States' BITs) 
215 See CETA， supra note 135; CETA Chapter Summaries， GIβB. AFFAIRS CAN. (July 14， 2017)， 
ht甲://www.international.gc.ca/町ade-commerce/町ade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-
aecg/chaptecsummary-resume_chapitre.aspx?lang=eng#a8 (explaining how since the Lisbon Treaty the 
EU has begun negotiating EU-wide bilateral investment agreements， including in form of investment 
provisions in i臼 freetrade agreements. CET A was the first EU agreement signed by the EU containing 
investment protection provisions. CET A established a new investment court system (“ICS")). See also 
RODERICK EDWARD & LAURA PUCCIO， EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT， FROM ARBITRATION TO THE INVESTMENT 
COURT SYSTEM (ICS): THE EVOLUTION OF CETA RULES 13-28 (2017)， 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu!RegData/etudesIIDAN/20 17 /607251APRS_IDA(20 17)60725 LEN.pdf 
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Eventually， as negotiators in an EU-China BIT and FTA attempt to 
reach an accommodation， including on labor provisions， China fals in the 
camp of leaving such social issues outside the commercial aspects of a trade 
agreement， such as is done with the WTO， and by Asian countries 
generally.216 This is reflected in China having no labor provisions in 8 of its 
13 FTAs.217 Of China's five FTA-MOU agreements with labor provisions， 
two have labor standards and enforcement watered down;218 while the other 
three agreements have labor provisions like those in EU FTAs.219 50， insum， 
both the European Union and China have labor provisions wherein they 
agree to obligations under ILO standards， agree to cooperate and consult if 
they disagree， and to use consultation as an enforcement mechanism. 
1. China 
China's use of labor protections in FTAs has varied over recent years. 
While its labor provisions with Chile and Iceland are vague， where the 
parties merely agree to cooperate on mutual labor matters of interest， 20
another somewhat progressive labor provision is found in the 2008 China-
New Zealand MOU，21 where China clearly commits to ILO core labor 
standards and both parties explicitly agree to enable unions and other 
organizations to participate in identifying and undertaking cooperative 
act1vlt1es. 
(discussing how concerns were raised regarding the differences between ISDS and domestic court. These 
relate both to the different treatment of foreign and domestic investors and to uncertainty regarding the 
compatibility of the ICS system with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order) 
216 See Brown， supra note 80， at 96-112 (noting an exception when Asian coun町iesnegotiate an 
agreement with a non-Asian developed coun町y，such as the U.S.， Au呂町alia，or the EU) 
217 See Brown， A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreemen何人 supranote 6， at14-17. 
218 China-Iceland FTA， supra note 76， art. 108 (the Iceland Agreement with China enhances labor 
communication and cooperation); see also China-Chile FTA， supra note 76 (the China-Chile FTA's MOU 
agrees to cooperation) 
219 See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation， supra note 103 (the New Zealand-China 
Agreement reaffirms ILO obligations and recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or failing to enforce labor laws， and that it is or use labor laws， regulations， 
policies and practices for trade protectionist p旧 poses.Like the EU， the enforcement mechanism is 
consultation). 
220 China-Iceland FTA， supra note 76， art. 108; see also China-Chile MOU on Labour and Social 
Security Cooperation， supra note 97; China-Chile FTA supra note 76， art. 2. 
221 See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation， supra note 103. 
DECEMBER 2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 111 
China's one FTA and MOU on labor with a European economy， 
Switzerland in 2013， may reflect the likely future accommodation with 
European Union in an EU-China FTA or BIT. It contains a commitment to 
the ILO Declaration and its core labor standards and， also， reaffirms the 
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work of 2006 and the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.22 The Parties also 
agree to a broad range of obligations to enforce their labor laws， to not 
encourage trade by reducing labor standards， and to not use domestic labor 
laws to further trade protectionism. Issues over its implementation are to be 
resolved though cooperation， consultation， and dialogue-a dispute 
resolution scheme similarly embraced by EU FTA labor provisions. 
2. European Union 
Labor provisions in the Social Dimension (Trade and Sustainable 
Development (“TSD") provisions in EU FTAs have developed and changed 
over the years. 
The 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) contained more references to social policy norms and 
core labor standards than EU's prior FTAs. It provided for labor 
issues to be referred to independent experts， and dialogue 
within a civil society mechanism (CSM) .. and it embodied 
EU's 'new generation' trade agreements to be found in 18 
countries by 2017， with bold claims made about their 
efficacy.223 
Typically， they include three primary provisions: first， commitments and 
obligations to labor standards tied to the ILO; second， a process to monitor 
the agreement， using cooperation， dialogue， and transparency; and thirdly， 
procedures and mechanisms for resolving labor disputes. Dispute resolution 
provisions are separate and different for labor than for trade， and since the 
EU -Korea FTA，24 al EU FTAs have that tripartite format. 25 
222 See China-Swiss FTA， supra note 76. 
223 Harrison et al.， supra note 4， at261. 
224 See id. Committees of statelEU officials from the two parties are established to oversee the 
implementation of the TSD chapter. These are advised by a CSM由attakes the form of a Domestic 
Advisory Group (“DAσ') including representatives of business， trade unions， NGOs， and occasionally 
academia， with the DAGs of the two parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally，出erelS an expert 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive labor provisions are found in the 
2016 CETA agreement. 226 The parties committed to the ILO Declaration and 
core labor standards， the Decent Work Agenda (covering health and safety 
standards)， and obligated themselves to enforce ILO core labor standards 
and their labor laws， promote the Decent Work Agenda， make sustained 
efforts to ratify the ILO core labor standards and other Conventions 
classified as “up-to-date' by the ILO， and not to reduce labor protections or 
use labor laws to encourage trade or investment. The labor dispute resolution 
process authorizes either Party to initiate the processes of consultation， to 
consult with its domestic advisory group， including labor unions， and to have 
mediation by a panel of experts. Decisions are made public and no sanctions 
or penalties are provided. This differs from U.S. FTAs， which have a unified 
dispute resolution process for trade and labor and provide for penalties for 
violations.227 
The Parties in the 2011 EU-South Korea FTA228 and the 2018 EU-
J apan FTA have labor obligations and dispute resolution procedures like 
those in CETA above.229 
panel由atinvestigates complaints made by the parties and makes recommendations on them. The 
implication of the agreement text is that these institutions will interact to effectively implement the TSD 
chapter. 
225 See CET A， supra note Error! Bookmark oot defioed.. European Commission Dispute resolution 
for町adedisputes has the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS")， where rights are vested in by 
corporations and obligations are binding for states and enforceable by the investors; labor dispute 
resolution is left for consultation. Likewise， investment disputes have an enforceable remedy. See also 
Michele Faioli， Atlantic Transitions戸rLaw and Labor: CETA First and刀 IPSecond人inSUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT， GLOBAL TRADE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS STUDlliS 凹 EMPLOYMENTAND SOCIAL POLICY 71，88 
(Adalberto Perulli & Tiziano Treu eds.， 2018). 
226 See generally CET A， supra note Error! Bookmark oot defioed.. 
227 Brown， supra note 112， at 176. This also contrasts to CETA's binding investment court system 
designed to protect foreign investors， the labor chapter's compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding 
process of cooperation， dialog and recommendations to address labor rights violations. See CET A， supra 
note 135， art. 8.10. 
228 For example， see discussion on South Korea in Gruni， supra note Error! Bookmark oot defioed.. 
A common argument is that the labor clause does include several innovative features which entrench the 
presence of labor law in international trade agreements. However， the clause remains mainly about 
political cooperation and struggles to define enforceable legal obligations on states. This is so because of 
the exceptions in由efirst part of the clause， the vagueness of the labor rights obligations and the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism 
229 See EU-Japan EPA， supra 117， art. 21. 
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The easiest way for the European Union and China to move forward 
on trade and investment talks is to finalize their BIT negotiations. Certainly， 
the inclusion of labor provisions should not be an obstacle as China already 
has embraced them in its FTA-MOU with Switzerland and several other 
countries. While the European Union has not yet included them solely in a 
BIT， though three Members of the European Union have included them， it
has included them in their FTAs and both China and the European Union 
have indicated they will include labor provisions in its EU -China BIT. 
B. Significance 01 Labor Provisions in FTAs 
There are many studies and diverse points of view on the practical 
usefulness of labor provlslons in trade agreements. One such study 
concluded that for EU bilateral trade agreements in force prior to 2010 those 
“with labor provisions have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
workers' rights in signatory nations."230 It further reported that“what causes 
this positive effect is the way state officials are educated about， and 
normalized into， upholding labor standards."231 Swiss unions state they look 
forward to their educational interaction with Chinese employers. 
Other studies within that study challenge these conclusions. Reports 
of serious shortcomings under the labor provisions of individual FTAs， 
where individual states claimed standards were lowered， were treated as 
“window dressing， were under-funded， and were “watered-down."232 
Interestingly， they also note the lack of enforceability is also raised as 
problematic by the other party to the EU FTAs.“[A]t the 2017 civil society 
forum of the EU-Korea FTA some participants tumed the discussion toward 
230 Harison et al.， supra note 4， at262. See also generally Damian Raes & Dora Sari， Labor 
Provisions in Trade Agreements (LABPTA): Introducing a New Dataset， 9 GIβBAL POL'y 451 (2018) 
(comp但-ingtypes of 1abor provisions); Damian Raes， Andreas Dur， & Dora Sari， Protecting Labor Rights 
in Preferential Trade Agreements， 13REv. INT'L ORG. 143 (2018). 
231 Harison et al.， supra note 4， at 262 
232 See id. at 263. A report ultimate1y critica1 of the va1ue of EU's TSD provisions conc1uded， 
“[O]veral， we found no evidence由atthe existence of TSD chapters have 1ed to improvements in 1abor 
standards governance in any of our case studies， nor did we find any evidence由atthe institutionalization 
of oportunities for 1earning and socialization between the parties was creating a significant prospect of 
1onger-term change . . . ." Id. at 273. Shou1d the EU therefore sek to put more of i臼 marketpower behind 
its 1abor governance strategy? Such an aproach cou1d in part be realized by the most common sugestion 
for reform from European interviewes invo1ved in the 1abor movement; name1y， increasing the 
enforceability of the TSD chapter by giving the EU the ability to withdraw preferentia1 aces to its market 
if 1abor standards are vio1ated. 
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inadequate protection of workers within the European Union， complicating 
the assumption that such provisions are essentially externally orientated."233 
This could prove prescient on an EU -China FTA， as labor conditions in 
some EU Member states are not dissimilar to some areas in China. In fact， 
the European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC") agrees with the 
shortcoming of the lack of enforcement and urges penalties be added.234 
Of course， changes could be made to improve enforceability of the 
labor provisions， such as looking to a modified dispute system allowing 
direct access to both trade and labor issues that would allow third-parties， 
such as labor unions， direct access to dispute procedures. In addition， 
allowing penalties for violations， empowering an outside panel or court (like 
CETA Investment provisions) to decide cases， or perhaps empowering NCPs 
as in OECD to make recommendations following investigations， would 
strengthen the enforcement mechanism.235 However， to be clear， there are 
two separate questions: 1) whether current enforcement procedures are 
sufficient and need modification; and 2) the question raised in this paper， 
whether current practices of European Union and China regarding inclusion 
of labor provisions in a BIT or FTA would be an obstacle to finding an 
accommodation so as to finalize the agreements. The conclusion is a clear-
there is no obstacle. 
C. The European Union and China: Reaching Accomodation on an EU-
China Labor Provision 
Considering the European Union's 2016 CETA and China-
Switzerland's 2013 FTA and 2013 MOU are the most comprehensive labor 
protection treaties for each， a brief comparison shows there is much in 
233 Id. at 274. See also generally James Harrison et al.， Labour Standards in EU Free Trade 
Agreements: Working Towards What End人 5GREAT INSIGHTS MAG. 6 (2016)， https://ecdpm.org/wp-
content!uploads/Great -Insights-Vo15 -Issue6-December-20 16. pdf. 
234 See ETUC， ETUC ASSESSMENT ON COMMISSION'S NON PAPER ON TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (TSD) CHAPTERS IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2018)， 
https://www.etuc.org/en/ document/etuc-assessment -commis sions-non -paper -trade-and -sustainable-
development-tsd-chapters-eu (it did so in its urging of inclusion in CETA). See also Angela Ptisterand & 
Eva Dessewffy， Labour Rights， inMAKING SENSE OF CETA 65-68 (2d ed. 2016) 
235 See Axel Marx， Franz Ebert， & Nicolas Hachez， Dispute Settlement for Labour Provisions in EU 
Free Trade Agreements， 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 49， 52 (2017) (arguing由atthere is a need to re由ink由e
dispute settlement mechanisms related to labor provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased) 
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common， and accommodation of an agreeable labor provision is completely 
feasible. Most of the provisions are the same， except as outlined below. 
The China-Switzerland MOU has an additional provision stating that 
labor laws will not be used for trade protectionist purposes，236 it has a 
detailed list of possible cooperative activities， and it has fewer express 
procedures for dispute resolution provlslOns， but likewise authorizes 
consultation for alleged violations or disagreements.237 
CETA has a more detailed step procedure within which consultation 
and mediation take place238 and it explicitly authorizes use of a domestic 
labor development advisory group that can include labor unions.239 A 
recommended decision is made by an internal panel of experts.240 There are 
no enforcement or penalty provisions. Either Party shall make the decision 
public within thirty days of its delivery.241 With such similar provisions， 
accommodation would likely only need to find the right language to express 
their common interests， already reflected in their prior agreements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The opportunity for closer economic relations between China and the 
European Union is now. The reasons are economic， geopolitical， and for the 
benefit of employers and workers on both sides. The opportunity must be 
boldly seized through a negotiated BIT or its inclusion within an EU -China 
FTA. 
While both sides will have their domestic political hurdles to 
surmount， this article shows that one potential political and economic 
obstacle， labor provisions in the Social Dimension provisions， islargely non-
existent under the current practices of European Union and China. 
236 China-Swis MOU， supra note 82， art. 2(6). 
237 Id. art. 4(2). 
238 CETA， supra note 135，但ts.23.9 & 23.10. 
239 Id. art. 23.8(4) 
240 Id. art. 23.10 
241 Id. art. 23.10(11) 
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The EU-China BIT and FTA can pave the silk road with a model for 
others to follow. 
